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THE MULTILATERAL FORCE--AN ANALYSIS
AND PRESENTATION OF UNITED STATES
POLICY AND OF THE REACTIONS OF THE
PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN POWERS

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THE MULTILATERAL FORCE--AN ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION
OF UNITED STATES POLICY AND OF THE
REACTIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN POWERS

by

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The Multilateral Force--An Analysis and
Presentation of United Policy and of the
Reactions of the Principal European Powers

The problem of nuclear control within NATO has created sharply divergent state views, policies, and actions. The United States proposed the concept of the Multilateral Force (MLF) in response to and as an attempted solution to the problems that developed over the control issue.

The thesis examines the interrelated issues of lack of consensus on Alliance strategy, credibility of the deterrent, and the matter of proliferation as they relate to the overall problem of nuclear control. The reactions of the principal European powers are also investigated to determine the implications of the MLF policy.

The thesis concludes that the issues over nuclear control remain and that the MLF proposal instead of giving cohesiveness to the Alliance managed to create a certain disharmony. The MLF concept is now in a state of indefinite suspension with little chance of revival.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The problem of nuclear control within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has developed over the last decade creating sharply divergent state views, policies, and actions. The Multilateral Force (commonly referred to as MLF), which the United States proposed in an effort to restore cohesion to the Atlantic Alliance, emerged instead as a controversial issue. One, but by no means sole result was that relations between the United States and the European Powers came into conflict.

A debate developed between America and Western Europe over the strategy and control of nuclear weapons within NATO which involved all of the countries within the Alliance. Each nation has issued elaborate policy statements to support its position and theories. Scholars, editors, and statesmen have joined in the examination of the problem to the point that the material available on the subject is overwhelming. Still the problems remain, and since the dispute directly affects the political future of Europe as well as its security, and the United States position in direct relationship to the Atlantic Community, the candidate felt the need for further study in order to understand the complexities of the situation. At the same time, the hope is raised that a small contribution to the extensive material already in

existence can be made, since the problem of relations between the United States and Europe with respect to nuclear control within NATO is one of major importance.

The safety of the United States depends on the security, prosperity, and solidarity of the Western Alliance and in turn the security and prosperity of Western Europe depends on the strength and will of the United States. NATO was formed on mutual dependence against a common threat to increase security and assist in restoring vitality to Western Europe. However, with the return of prosperity and with the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, Europe has wanted a say in the control over its destiny.

The United States designed the MLF to meet the requirement over the control issue and to act as an alternative to the development of individual nuclear forces. The hope was to provide a framework which would meet the demands of the NATO countries, in particular West Germany, and thereby create a greater cohesiveness within the Atlantic Alliance.

The control problem has been present in NATO ever since nuclear weapons were first introduced as a key element in the defense of Western Europe in 1954. Since that time, three major problem areas have developed in NATO to which MLF evolved as an attempted response. The first, and fundamental problem, from which the other two derive, is the lack of a basic strategic consensus. This is certainly not a new

problem but one which has come into clearer focus as Western Europe developed self-sufficiency and the Soviet Union broke the nuclear monopoly. The second, is the question of credibility of the deterrent, which has become the center of debate in Western circles and an important factor in examining various strategies and weapons systems. Finally, of major concern is the matter of proliferation, which is a logical outcome to no agreement on strategy and serious doubts as to credibility.

These interrelated issues will be examined in the following pages by referring to speeches and writings of responsible officials entrusted with making foreign policy statements for both the United States, France and other key countries. The first chapter develops the history of the MLF. Next, the French position on nuclear matters and independence of action are examined. In the following chapter the policy of the United States is investigated. The fifth chapter looks at the positions of the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Chapter Six attempts to summarize the overall central problem of nuclear control and the matter of proliferation. Since the major research for the paper covered a time frame up to the end of 1965, an attempt has been made in an epilogue to update the thesis to July, 1966, in order to cover the major event of the French withdrawal from NATO.

The actions of France, once again, have caused the NATO countries to shift their immediate attention away from the problems which serve as a basis and are key to the control issue facing NATO; problems which must be solved if the NATO Alliance is to regain and maintain a necessary cohesiveness.

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN AND CONCEPT OF MLF

A Background History

In laying the basis for the multilateral nuclear force (MLF), there is the necessity to return to the dawn of the missile age in 1957. In July of that year, the United States announced plans to establish nuclear arms stockpiles in Europe for use by NATO armies and to sell intermediate-range missiles to Britain.¹

The motivation behind this move was strategic as well as political. The Soviet Union, by this time, was known to have intermediate-range missiles which could destroy key NATO bases. Although tactical nuclear weapons were in NATO under strict United States control, strategic weapons to oppose the Soviet force had not been installed. Political pressure had been mounting within NATO over the control of tactical weapons because Western Europe felt a certain hostageship to the United States monopoly which could lead to a nuclear exchange in Europe.

The fear that the United States might recklessly cause Europe's annihilation soon took a reverse cast with the advent of the Soviet Union's Sputnik. In October 1957, the successful launching of the earth satellites symbolized

¹The New York Times, July 17, 1957.

the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Now the allies had a contradictory but significant fear that the United States might flinch at using nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. They felt that American cities would be the target of Soviet retaliation and this would prevent the United States from using nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe.

In order to allay Europe's fears, President Eisenhower attended the NATO meetings in Paris in December, 1957 and assured the allies that America would come to their defense. At the North Atlantic Council meeting, Secretary Dulles presented a plan to disperse Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's) and nuclear stockpiles in Europe with the assurance that the decision to use the missiles would be a bilateral arrangement.²

The plan was approved, permitting the United States to execute bilateral agreements with its allies to place IRBM's on allied soil in accordance with NATO plans. The decision to use the missiles was to be a joint one, with the ally controlling the missile and the United States controlling the nuclear warhead, which in effect, gave both a veto. In addition, stocks of nuclear warheads for both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were to be dispersed in places accessible in the event of war, under the custody of the

²The New York Times, December 17, 1957.

Supreme Allied Commander in Europe acting in the capacity as an American Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR.)³

Britain agreed to the IRBM offer and Thor missiles were placed there under a two-key system in 1958. Authorization by both Great Britain and the United States was required to join the warhead to the missile and fire it. Jupiter IREM's were accepted by Italy and Turkey in 1959 in similar agreements. France refused to accept any missiles or warheads unless she could have control of both.⁴

The refusal of France to accept bilateral control of missiles emphasized the issue that Europe wanted a greater share in the operation of the NATO nuclear capability. Concern was voiced that if the United States did not grant her allies a greater share in control of weapons, they would either seek neutrality or proceed to develop their own nuclear force. Either case would affect the security of the United States and NATO by diluting the cohesion of the alliance.

France accepted the alternative of developing her own nuclear force, declaring she would proceed with or without United States assistance. Further, she would proceed despite a nuclear test ban, formal or informal, as she was

³ Robert E. Osgood, NATO The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 221-22.

⁴ Ibid., p. 223.

determined to become a nuclear power, at least equal to Great Britain, even though the United States was openly committed to developing a nuclear test ban and desirous of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. The French action only created increased pressure on the United States by its allies for greater control over nuclear weapons as an effective alternative to independent forces. The prospect of other nations following the French example was very real. In August, 1959 a solution to the problem was proposed by General Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), in a speech calling for the establishment of NATO as a "fourth nuclear power" with its own control over nuclear weapons.⁵ The missiles were to be of medium range (MRBM) with a range of about twelve hundred miles to meet NATO's tactical requirements. General Norstad subsequently indicated he had in mind a multinational operation of landbased Polaris missiles to replace outmoded aircraft.⁶

In February, 1960, France exploded her first test nuclear bomb which led to further proposals over the problem of control. In March, General Norstad proposed a multinational unit to be composed initially of the United States, Britain, and France under a single commander, not

⁵ Ibid., p. 229.

⁶ Robert E. Osgood, Nuclear Control in NATO. (Washington: Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1962), p. 2.

to be an American. The United States supported the plan but re-emphasized the condition that the nuclear warhead must remain under American control, a stipulation which made acceptance unlikely.⁷

However, some system was needed to replace the slow-to-fire and very vulnerable Thor and Jupiter missiles installed in Europe as a counter-balance to Soviet IRBM's. A formula for nuclear control was needed that would satisfy Congress and yet be equally acceptable to the Allies. Further, it must satisfy other countries fearful of the spread of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had threatened the United States that she would consider giving her allies nuclear weapons if controls were released by the United States.⁸ Despite the pressure, continued proposals were suggested in an effort to set up an integrated allied force.

Secretary of Defense Gates, in April, 1960, proposed the deployment of Polaris missiles on barges and flatcars and suggested a modification to the dual-control system, giving the decision to join the missile and warhead to the Supreme Commander of NATO. De Gaulle, however, would not

⁷The New York Times, March 3, 1960. General Norstad reiterated the proposal of NATO having a nuclear capacity of its own before the Sixth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in November 1960. See United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Sixth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p.2.

⁸Ibid. March 20, 1960

accept the plan unless one-third of the Polaris installations were given to France for her control with her own warheads.⁹ The plan was dropped because the United States desired to put part of the installations in France, but not under sole French control. French opposition led to a new proposal which would not be dependent on French soil.

The State Department developed the Bowie plan which was to become a NATO deterrent under NATO command. This plan, authored by Robert R. Bowie, then Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, consisted of two major parts: (1) a fleet of Polaris submarines that would utilize multinational crews, and in addition land-type Polaris missiles; (2) a conventional force buildup was to take place which would provide for the conventional defense of Europe.¹⁰

The Bowie plan is probably the true predecessor of MLF. The first part developed the ideas of multinational crews for a seaborne deterrent. The second part of the plan appeared to call for a change in strategy by emphasizing a conventional buildup. The control issue was to be settled by each country having a veto over the use of the force--unanimity was required to place the force in motion. The Soviet Union attacked the idea of NATO becoming a nuclear

⁹ Osgood, NATO the Entangling Alliance, p. 232.

¹⁰ The New York Times, October 13, 1960.

power as a scheme to prevent disarmament talks and peace.¹¹

At the NATO Council meeting in Paris in December 1960, Secretary of State Herter advanced a modified Bowie plan proposal for a NATO controlled MRBM force which was to be composed of five ballistic missile submarines. In addition, the concept was to include the purchase by the allies of one hundred more missiles to be placed on other ships under NATO control. However, the package was conditional in that it required the allies to agree to a "multilateral system" of political control, and Secretary Herter pointed out that Congress would have to approve any arrangement made for such a force.¹²

The conditional nature of the proposal coupled with the problem of working out a multilateral system of control tended to minimize interest in the proposition, and it consequently met with a cool reception in every country except Germany and Italy. A change in the administration at this point also had an influence on non-acceptance as it was realized that the outgoing Eisenhower administration could not commit the incoming Kennedy administration to any such plan. The NATO Council noted the proposal and agreed to study the suggestion in detail, but the Allies decided to wait for

¹¹Ibid., December 14, 1960.

¹²Ibid., December 17, 1960.

firmer proposals by the new administration.¹³ One of the first moves made by the new Kennedy administration was to set up an informal commission of inquiry headed by Dean Acheson. The Acheson Committee examined the merits of the schemes proposed to strengthen NATO under the multinational concept as opposed to a multilateral component within the alliance. Rand Corporation's Albert Wohlstetter headed up the multinational proposal and Professor Bowie the multilateral study.¹⁴ It appears that certain facets of both concepts won out as the Kennedy administration adopted the original proposals made by Secretary Herter.

The President announced in May, 1961 at Ottawa ". . . the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne missile force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies once NATO non-nuclear goals have been achieved."¹⁵ In this speech, President Kennedy reiterated the United States offer of five Polaris submarines, but there was no specific mention of the 100 missiles which Secretary Herter had proposed. Conditions again appeared when President Kennedy required the achievement of NATO's

¹³ Ibid., December 19, 1960.

¹⁴ Alastair Buchan, The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, Number Thirteen, October, 1964), p.5.

¹⁵ The New York Times, May 18, 1961.

non-nuclear goals. This indicated that the Kennedy administration accepted the Bowie Plan but made its second part a precondition to the creation of a NATO nuclear force.

The following year at the Athens Ministers' meeting, the United States announced the assignment of five Polaris submarines to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, (SACLANT). However, NATO was well aware that the assignment did not affect political control of the vessels since they would be manned by American crews which could only fire on order of the President. The communique that was issued showed agreement had been reached to set up special procedures for the exchange of information.¹⁶ There was also a noticeable effort on the part of Secretary of Defense McNamara to impress the Allied Ministers with United States nuclear supremacy in hopes of discouraging independent forces and dispelling fears of any missile gap. It was also a prelude to United States concerted effort to build up NATO's conventional forces.

The famous June 16, 1962, Ann Arbor speech by the United States Defense Secretary was another call for the buildup of conventional strength. To support a new American strategy of "controlled response," McNamara stated that the Alliance had overall nuclear strength adequate to meet any challenge confronting it. He attacked small and independent

¹⁶Ibid., May 7, 1962.

national forces, proclaiming them "dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent."¹⁷ McNamara also tried to inject further confidence in the American will to protect NATO by declaring that "the United States had undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis."¹⁸ No mention was made of a NATO nuclear force and there was a strong, immediate reaction to the speech in Western Europe, especially by Britain.

Pressure continued to mount for an alternative to national forces. General Norstad, Chancellor Adenauer, Germany's Defense Minister Strauss, and NATO Secretary General Stikker, continued to advocate and had become insistent on a NATO nuclear force.¹⁹ This led the American government to study actively, elaborate, and explore with key allies, a concrete plan developed in the Navy, for a fleet of surface vessels to carry Polaris under joint control of NATO and be operated by a multinational crew.²⁰

Added stimulus was created by the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962. President De Gaulle's determination

¹⁷Ibid., June 17, 1962. Text of Ann Arbor speech by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Robert E. Osgood, The Case For the MLF: A Critical Evaluation (Washington: The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1964), p. 6.

²⁰Ibid.

to continue his force de frappe, and his drive for leadership of the Europe he envisions, provided further pressures. De Gaulle saw ownership of nuclear weapons as the great equalizer and, according to Ronald Steel, Europeans learned two crucial lessons from the Cuban missile crisis:

The first was that the United States was ready to risk the nuclear obliteration of its Allies in defense of American interests, although the United States would not allow itself to be drawn into danger in defense of European interests--as its actions in the Suez landings demonstrated. The second lesson was that the two nuclear giants would impose whatever settlement they saw fit upon weak third nations involved in their power rivalry.²¹

Somehow the United States had to rebut these feelings. Under-Secretary of State Ball, in an address to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference on November 16, 1962, reopened the question of a NATO nuclear force. Although he stated there was no urgent need from a military standpoint, he said the United States was ready ". . . to give serious consideration to the creation of a genuinely multilateral, medium-range ballistic missile force, fully coordinated with the other deterrent forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."²²

Then at the December, 1962, NATO Council Meeting,

²¹Ronald Steel, "The Demise of NATO," Commentary, XXXV (May, 1963), 401.

²²George W. Ball, "NATO and the Cuban Crisis," The Department of State Bulletin, XLVII (December 3, 1962), 835.

Secretary of Defense McNamara appeared to back away from any additional nuclear forces. He reiterated that he saw no need for additional strategic forces and recommended a change in strategy. He referred to reversing the sword and shield concept, by giving the role of sword to the conventional forces and making nuclear strength the shield. This reversal of the sword-shield concept naturally was critically received in West Germany.²³ It was looked upon by the Germans as opening up the possibility of conventional war on their territory. It also made their desire for some control of nuclear planning all the more pressing.

At the Nassau Conference, the project of a multilateral force was finally launched. In the communique of December 21, 1962, Article 7 stated:

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the purpose of their two Governments with respect to the provision of the Polaris missile must be the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the consultation with other NATO Allies. They will use their best endeavors to this end.²⁴

Article 6 had called for forces already in existence to be allotted to a nuclear force. It was proposed that the allocations be made from United States strategic forces, the British Bomber Command, and from tactical nuclear forces held in Europe. Thus, the meeting called to discuss a replacement for the cancelled Skybolt missile appeared to

²³The New York Times, December 13, 1962.

²⁴Ibid., December 22, 1962.

direct attention to two separate principles: On the one hand, multilateral (Art. 7) and on the other, multinational (Art. 6). As events turned out the British obviously envisioned a future structure of NATO organized around a closer commitment of existing and future national forces, while the United States planned on a new multilateral force consisting of submarines or surface ships jointly financed, owned, and controlled by the participants depending upon their contribution.

France looked upon the Nassau meeting as a special agreement to perpetuate the British independent force. Criticism was voiced that the Nassau formula had only bilateral sponsorship and therefore did not include all nuclear powers within NATO, despite the fact that France was later offered Polaris.²⁵ Thus, some claim de Gaulle made his decision to exclude Britain from the Common Market. If Britain could have such a strong link and special relationship to the United States, then she didn't belong as a truly European power. There is no doubt de Gaulle felt excluded from the Nassau agreement, but on the other hand, he might well have wanted to have been excluded, as events since then have indicated. Following Nassau, a promotion campaign for MLF commenced and the proposal became a prime objective of American policy.

²⁵Ibid., December 31, 1962.

In an effort to meet European desires to gain an active role in the management of the Alliance's nuclear power, President Kennedy appointed a Multilateral Force Negotiating Team in January, 1963, led by Ambassador Livingston Merchant.²⁶ The purpose of the team was to work out the concept of a multilateral force in greater detail and discuss the program with NATO government and military leaders. After favorable reception of the plan by the governments of Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, with some interest shown by Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, a working group was established to discuss the basic elements in detail. In April, 1963, Under Secretary Ball outlined the major criteria which would guide the formation of the force: (1) A large number of participants; (2) a force not based in one country; (3) withdrawal of components impossible, and; (4) the decision making process was to be collective. He further commended the MLF:

Not only is it the best means of dealing with the nuclear problem in the present political framework; it is also a means of promoting gradual and constructive evolution within that framework. The multilateral force would offer the great advantage of a further opportunity to work toward greater unity in Europe and closer partnership between Europe and the United States.²⁷

²⁶ Alvin J. Cottrell, James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 106.

²⁷ George W. Ball, "The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance," Department of State Bulletin, XLVIII (May 13, 1963), 739.

Beginning in October, 1963, the working group held meetings in Paris in an attempt to reach agreement on what MLF would involve, reach conclusions as to its political and technical feasibility, and develop language for a draft charter. The following year the proposal was fairly well established.

The Proposal²⁸

The United States MLF proposal consisted of twenty-five surface ships resembling merchant-type vessels. Each ship would carry eight Polaris A-3 missiles with an intermediate range, (2500 plus miles). The crews to man these ships would be made up of the participating NATO nations, (at least three), with no nationality comprising more than forty percent of any one ship's complement.

The force would be owned and controlled by an international organization under the direction of a board composed of representatives of the joining nations. The board would have a civilian director-general who would manage the fleet through a military force commander. The fleet would be assigned to NATO under the operational control of SACEUR.

The force was conceived as being open to all members

²⁸ United States Department of State, "The Multilateral Force, Questions and Answers" (Washington: November 10, 1964) pp. 1-22, (mimeographed). All information in this section relates to this document.

of NATO willing to assume a fair share of the cost, with such a share not to exceed forty per cent, thereby preventing any one country from gaining controlling interest. Financial contribution would determine command of the ships. Cost of the total force, including its armaments, bases, and operations for the first five years was estimated at 2.3 billion dollars. Average annual cost would have meant a contribution of between $\frac{3}{4}$ and four per cent of the members' annual military budgets.

Decision to release any weapon would be made by the board with agreement being reached by a certain percentage of the representatives and only with concurrence by the United States. Once the decision was reached, the missiles were to be released to SACEUR to be fired in accordance with an integrated nuclear plan of the Alliance.

In order to demonstrate the feasibility of the mixed-manned crew concept, the USS Biddle (later renamed USS Claude V. Ricketts), a guided missile destroyer, was placed at the disposal of interested NATO countries in June, 1964. The ship conducted operations and training with personnel from the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Turkey later withdrew membership in February, 1965.²⁹

²⁹"The Mixed-Manning Demonstration," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XCI (July, 1965), 89; The Washington Post, November 13, 1965.

Upon the completion of the mixed-manning demonstrations on December 1, 1965, Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze called the experiment a success and an ". . . impressive chapter in the history of NATO cooperation."³⁰

Although the USS Ricketts proved the feasibility of a mixed-manning system, the major block of an MLF has been political and not technical. As demonstrated in Ricketts, the technical problems of mixing nationalities can be solved, but the major and age old problem of politics is not so easily resolved. The debate over a NATO nuclear force has been in progress for five years. The next three chapters will be devoted to the political picture in an attempt to gain an understanding of the effect the MLF proposal had on international relations.

³⁰ The Washington Post, (December 2, 1965), p. A12. For details on problems that were solved on pay, discipline and rating structure see Desmond Wettern, "A Reporter Rides The Ricketts," Navy the Magazine of Sea Power, VIII (September, 1965), p. 34-37.

CHAPTER III

THE FRENCH POSITION

Force de Frappe and Independence

France was among the pioneers of atomic research before 1939, but her first nuclear device exploded in February, 1960, grew out of an atomic energy program that was initiated in 1945 and later reoriented toward military considerations in 1952.¹ The resulting French national nuclear force known as the force de frappe or force de dissuasion has been the subject of tremendous controversy and debate. The French strategic nuclear force, nevertheless, is a force in being and still expanding. It has been belittled, sneered at, degraded, on the other hand, justified and used to political advantage. It is no doubt looked upon with envy by countries not within the "nuclear club." To be certain, the force is used as a political lever both domestically and in foreign relations.

Within the country, the notion has been fostered that a nation as important as France should not have to rely on the nuclear umbrella of an ally. One justification is on the basis that a French force is necessary to protect France and Europe from Soviet threats or attack, since the United

¹Wolf Mendl, "The Background of French Nuclear Policy," International Affairs, XLI (January, 1965), 22-30.

States is now vulnerable and might not carry out its guarantee to protect Europe. The President of France, Charles de Gaulle who feels it would be nationally degrading not to possess nuclear weapons in a nuclear age has brought the point of trust forth on many occasions:

. . . First, Soviet Russia also now has an enormous nuclear arsenal which is increasing every day, as moreover, is that of the United States. Henceforth, America and Soviet Russia will be capable of striking each other directly and, doubtless, of reciprocally destroying each other. It is not certain that they will take this risk. No one can tell today when, how, or why one or the other of these great atomic powers would employ its nuclear arsenal. It is enough to say this is in order to understand that, as regards the defense of France, the battle of Europe and even a world war as they were imagined when NATO was born everything is now in question. On the other hand, a French atomic deterrent force is coming into existence and is going to grow continuously. It is a relatively modest force, it is true, but one which is changing and will completely change the conditions of our own defense, those of our intervention in faraway lands and those of the contribution that we would be able to make to the safeguard of our allies.²

In de Gaulle's judgment, military matters belong to his "reserved domain" and this view is widely accepted by virtue of his hold on the voters and his power over his Gaullist deputies. Beyond his singular power, the reasoning is easily sold that a country of France's dimensions and degree of development should, as a matter of course, have

² Charles de Gaulle, "Sixth Press Conference on May 15, 1962" Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 15, 1958-January 31, 1964. (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division, 1964), p. 160.

some control over nuclear weapons more assured than an ally's guarantee that he will use his weapons on France's behalf. Full national ownership and operation of such weapons satisfies this demand. De Gaulle's insistence on independence and demand on his own nuclear striking force, for France's own defense was well stated right after the Nassau agreement:

. . . But also for a great people to have the free disposition of itself and the means to struggle to preserve it is an absolute imperative, for alliances have no absolute virtues, whatever may be the sentiments on which they are based. And if one spontaneously loses, even for a while, the free disposition of oneself, there is a strong risk of never regaining it. And then, the conditions in which we presently find ourselves also make it imperative for us to act in this manner.

We are in the atomic age and we are a country that can be destroyed at any moment unless the aggressor is deterred from the undertaking by the certainty that he too will suffer frightful destruction. This justifies both alliance and independence. The Americans, our allies and our friends, have for a long time, alone, possessed a nuclear arsenal. So long as they alone had such an arsenal and so long as they showed their will to use it immediately if Europe were attacked--for at that time Europe alone could be attacked--the Americans acted in such a way that for France the question of an invasion hardly arose, since an attack was beyond all probability It can be said that, during that period, the deterrent worked and that there existed a practically insuperable obstacle to an invasion of Europe. It is impossible to overestimate the extent of the service, most fortunately passive, that the Americans at that time, in that way, rendered to the freedom of the world.

Since then the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear arsenal, and that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger the very life of America. Naturally, I am not making an evaluation--if indeed it is possible to find a relation between the degree of one death and the degree of another--but the new and gigantic fact is there. From then on, the Americans found and are finding themselves confronted with the possibility of direct destruction. Thus, the immediate defense, and one can say privileged defense of Europe, and the military participation of the

Europeans, which were once basic factors of their strategy, moved by the force of circumstances into second place. We have just witnessed this during the Cuban affair.

And then, above and beyond everything; the deterrent is now a fact for the Russians as for the Americans, which means that in the case of a general atomic war, there would inevitably be frightful and perhaps fatal destruction in both countries. In these conditions, no one in the world--particularly no one in America--can say if, where, when, how and to what extent the American nuclear weapon would be employed to defend Europe . . . But it remains that the American nuclear power does not necessarily and immediately meet all the eventualities concerning Europe and France.

Thus principles and realities combine to lead France to equip herself with an atomic force of her own.³

Nothing could be more clearly stated than that which the two foregoing speeches illustrates--de Gaulle wants "independence" and "greatness" for France and his national nuclear force is a means to that end. He has continued this same theme throughout all of his speeches on the subject.⁴ Although the theme for public consumption might be "independence" and "greatness," a number of other points should be taken into consideration:

(1) When and if a united Europe develops, the force de frappe well could play an important role in determining the leadership of such a country.

(2) An independent force may well be the deciding

³ Ibid., "Seventh Press Conference on January 14, 1963," pp. 216-17.

⁴ Ibid., "Address April 19, 1963," pp. 225-26.

factor in forcing the United States into a nuclear war against its will.

(3) On the other hand, the French force might well be used to keep France out of a conflict into which otherwise she might be drawn against her will. Undoubtedly, the Cuban missile crisis made the French public aware of American power to draw France into a war even while she might prefer to remain neutral.

Thus with just these few points the force de dissuasion is something to be reckoned with and to be concerned about. Though very small in comparison to United States or Soviet power, the force, none the less, has tremendous implications. The French claim that "X" number of Mirage IV bombers traveling at twice the speed of sound carrying 60 kiloton atomic bombs (the power of the Hiroshima bomb was 20 kilotons) a claimed distance of 1550 miles without refueling have significance. With KC 135 tanker planes, which the United States has sold to France, this distance is reported to be almost doubled to just under 3000 miles.⁵

The French Strategic Air Force (SAF) with its complement of 62 Mirage IV bombers will be dispersed at twelve SAF bases. The hope is that more than 50 per cent will always be operational and on an 24 hour alert, with the ability to

⁵France and its Armed Forces. (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division, December, 1964), p.9. The Mirage IV became operational in 1964; a total of 62 planes are to be completed by the end of 1966.

be air-borne in four minutes. However, one of the glaring weaknesses of this force is the short range of the planes at low altitude. The Mirage IV needs refueling in the air for attacks further than West Germany. The plane uses one-third of its fuel load climbing to altitude where it becomes very vulnerable during refueling and is easily viewed by enemy defensive radar.⁶ Providing the force is not knocked out by an enemy surprise missile attack at the twelve bases prior to launch, how many of the 31 (plus) planes will get through to their targets? The answer to this question, after all, determines the significant of the force and whether or not it is a credible deterrent.

To follow in the second generation, called the Second Program Law in the time span of 1965-70 are strategic surface missiles with a range of 2000 miles. By the end of the period, France plans to have its first nuclear powered submarine armed with strategic sea-to-surface ballistic missiles with thermonuclear warheads. Included in the program are tactical nuclear weapons, with all services armed by 1973. To finance the second generation weapons for the strategic nuclear force, \$5.72 billion has been allotted in program

⁶ The New York Times, July 10, 1966; The Toronto Globe and Mail, June 23, 1966.

authorizations.⁷

The French military budget since 1960 averages about 5 per cent of GNP (7 per cent for 1963 when military pensions are included): this accounts for an increase in total military appropriations from 3.4 billion in 1960 to 4.2 billion for 1965 when the annual growth rate of approximately 4 per cent in GNP is taken into consideration. The cost of the strategic nuclear force has stayed within about 25 per cent of the total military budget mainly by reducing operating expenditures--this reflects the end of Algerian operations and the reduction of numerical strength of more than 1 million men in 1961 to a strength of 505,000 in 1965.⁸ From the above alone the strategy of France begins to take on a clear cut definition--reliance on nuclear weapons.

Strategy

From 1954 onwards, a small but influential group of military technicians favoured nuclear weapons. They theorized that nuclear weapons had a relative cheapness when compared with the equivalent amount of conventional explosives, because they were infinitely more effective than conventional weapons and because they would balance

⁷France and its Armed Forces. op. cit., pp. 52-53. "Between the strategic force's first generation of Mirage IV aircraft--to be phased out starting in 1968--and second generation of nuclear missile-launching submarines to be fully operational around 1970-1973--there will be a transitional period during which strategic surface-to-surface ballistic missiles will be set up in scattered hardened sites, and be operational by 1969; The Washington Post, July 13, 1966.

⁸Ibid., pp. 43-46.

the enemy's numerical superiority on the battlefield.⁹

Among this group and since December, 1952, General Ailleret now Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, had been instrumental in studies which led to the manufacture of the first French nuclear device.¹⁰ General Ailleret is recognized as one of the leading spokesman of French strategy today--a strategy that almost completely rules out conventional defense.

Immediate "massive retaliation" is seen as the only alternative to Soviet aggression. Even tactical nuclear warfare is discarded on the grounds that it ". . . would completely crush Europe for 1,300 miles from the Atlantic to the Soviet border."¹¹

Thus in General Ailleret's words:

Nuclear weapons alone seem able to permit a defensive without surrendering territory, something which neither conventional forces, nor even forces engaging in the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons against the aggressive force alone, could presume to accomplish.¹²

Characterizing conventional defense and nuclear defensive battle as not being satisfactory for Europe, General Ailleret sees the only alternative as being immediate

⁹ Mendl, op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 36.

¹¹ General Ailleret, "The Flexible Response, A French View," Military Review, XLV (February 1965), 82, condensed from Revue de Defense Nationale (August-September, 1964).

¹² Ibid., p. 83.

strategic action which in the event of aggression consist of:

(1) Destroying, by strategic nuclear attack, the roots of the aggression and its chances of building up.

(2) Terminating the action by a battle aimed simply at absorbing the momentum of the aggression--which may have already broken through--and at destroying it or forcing it back behind its bases of departure.¹³

France feels this strategy alone establishes a credible deterrent against possible Soviet aggression; aggression that is defined not as major or limited aggression but as "characterized aggression" or "apparent aggression." Apparent aggression covers all sorts of possible border incidents and must be considered as minor and not a triggering device for the automatic strategy. Characterized aggression on the other hand is real and is defined:

. . . as a penetration, using force against the defense elements encountered, reaching a depth into the territory defined in relation to the nature of the region involved, and putting enough forces in the field for it not to be considered as anything other than an action concordant with the will of the country to which these forces belong to conquer part of Western Europe.

That is why we suggest a defensive position designed not to check powerful attacks, but to gauge the minimum level of enemy attack that would constitute aggression which, in turn, could set the defensive nuclear strategy in motion.¹⁴

Thus automatic nuclear retaliation is brought into motion once aggression as defined takes place. This formula

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 83-85.

allows for minimal conventional forces on the frontiers with greater reserve forces positioned within the country--backed up with a strategic nuclear force controlled nationally--a posture to which France is deeply committed. Naturally a strategy such as this is not compatible with the United States doctrine of "flexible response." Neither is it compatible with an idea such as the MLE, or for that matter with any integration within NATO. But it must be remembered that ". . . because each nation sees its destiny in different terms, each also conceives of different means or strategy to achieve its objectives."¹⁵ General de Gaulle wants the destiny of France within his control and is aware of the bargaining power an independent force gives him.

De Gaulle's Leadership and Views

In simple terms it is fair to estimate de Gaulle's primary goal was to achieve "greatness and independence" for France. After assuming power in 1958, one of his first foreign policy moves was to propose an international directorate or triumvirate consisting of France, the United States and the United Kingdom which would control defense as well as diplomatic policies of the NATO allies. When this proposal was rejected by both the United States and Great Britain, it must have been received as a block in the path

¹⁵ Carl H. Amme, Jr., "Nuclear Control and the Multilateral Force," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XCI (April, 1965), 26.

to attaining a great power role for France. Many have contended that this rejection coupled with the Roosevelt and Churchill rebuffs during World War II caused basic hostility and set the pattern for de Gaulle to seek independent policies for France. Be that as it may, the facts stand out that de Gaulle will accept nothing but independence for France along with a great power role in sharing in big decisions.

A favorite observation of de Gaulles' points out that conditions under which Europe after the war "found it expedient to turn over to the United States the responsibility for its protection have changed profoundly!"¹⁶ His feeling that France and Europe should not accept domination by the United States through any form of integration was clearly outlined at his press conference on April 11, 1961:

It is intolerable for a great State to leave its destiny up to the decisions and action of another State, however friendly it may be. In addition, it happens that, in integration . . . the integrated country loses interest in its national defense, since it is not responsible for it. The whole structure of the alliance then loses its resilience and its strength.¹⁷

¹⁶United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership I, 87th Congress, 2d Session, Document No. 132 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 35-36.

¹⁷De Gaulle, op. cit. p. 124.

The project of a multilateral force was considered in Paris as a scheme to isolate France in Western Europe and strengthen United States hegemony. De Gaulle wants to avoid links that make him dependent on another--the normal situation in his view is for Europe (under French leadership) to develop and issue its own policy. In Henry Kissinger's words: "This is why de Gaulle has opposed the Nassau Agreement, which tied the British nuclear program to that of the United States, and the proposed NATO multilateral force."¹⁸ In effect, any nuclear program that gives the United States the final say or veto in the control of weapons is and would be unacceptable to the President of France. This he outlined in his famous Press Conference on January 14, 1963, when he rejected Britain's membership in the Common Market and said of the Nassau proposal:

. . . To turn over our weapons to a multilateral force, under a foreign command, would be to act contrary to that principle of our defense and our policy. It is true that we too can theoretically retain the ability to take back in our hands, in the supreme hypothesis, our atomic weapons incorporated in the multilateral force. But how could we do it in practice during the unheard moments of the atomic apocalypse? And then, this multilateral force necessarily entails a web of liaisons, transmissions and interferences within itself, and on the outside a ring of obligations such that, if an integral part were suddenly snatched from it, there would be strong risk of paralyzing it just at the moment, perhaps, when it should act.¹⁹

¹⁸Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York: Mc Graw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 51.

¹⁹De Gaulle, op. cit., p. 219.

Of course the whole timing of the Nassau agreement has brought up the question of whether this in itself was a cause for France to reject British membership in the EEC. Undoubtedly the fact that a multilateral program was negotiated in a bilateral context which only tended to strengthen the view of a special Anglo-American relationship makes it at least a contributing cause. As if to point out that France was left out of the negotiations de Gaulle said:

Of course, I am only speaking of this proposal and agreement because they have been published and because their content is known France has taken note of the Anglo-American Nassau agreement. As it was conceived, undoubtedly no one will be surprised that we cannot subscribe to it.²⁰

In a staff study, the Committee on Foreign Relations called the bilateral negotiations the most serious and least defensible aspect of the Nassau meeting.²¹ From another aspect de Gaulle probably felt badly discriminated against--this was the reversal of the "sword and shield" strategic concept. Prior to December, 1962, NATO's non-nuclear forces were always referred to as the "shield," while the nuclear force was called the "sword." The final paragraph of the Nassau Agreement said: "The President and

²⁰ Ibid., p. 218-19.

²¹ United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership II, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 21. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 20.

the Prime Minister agreed that in addition to having a nuclear shield it is important to have a non-nuclear sword."²² This reversal of terms naturally did nothing to contribute to basic United States credibility in Europe's eyes (commitment to use nuclear forces to defend Europe if attacked), and only tended to strengthen de Gaulle's pronouncements on dependence on no one--a consistent theme.

Explicit in announcing a lack of confidence in the American will to defend Europe de Gaulle has said:

For France to deprive herself of the means capable of dissuading the adversary from possible attack . . . would mean that she would confide her defense and therefore her existence, and in the end her policy to a foreign and for that matter, an uncertain protector.²³

This again points to de Gaulle's prime objective of independence, grandeur and rank for France. Nonetheless, initially, France claimed she did not object to her other NATO allies joining a project such as the MLF. Evidently she counted on it never materializing. In February, of 1964, the Ambassador of France to the United States, Herve Alphand, explained French non-participation in MLF negotiations in a speech:

. . . This will explain to you why we are not taking part in the negotiations for the establishment of a multilateral Atlantic force, because we do not have the financial and technical means both to continue with our

²²Ibid. Secretary McNamara had just referred to this reversal at the December NATO Council Meeting--West Germany was also highly critical of the new sword-shield concept.

²³As cited in Amme, op. cit., p. 26.

own effort and to take part in the effort undertaken within NATO. I should add that, even though we do not understand too well the conditions under which such a multilateral force could be used, we have done nothing to discourage anyone from participating in the studies under way at present.²⁴

In the summer of 1964, when the United States campaign for an MLF was in full swing, Chancellor Erhard met President Johnson in Texas and agreed to attempt to set up MLF by December. At this point de Gaulle started an anti-MLF campaign and accused Germany of submitting to United States domination.²⁵ French hostility is not hard to understand in the context that an MLF concept would be a block to de Gaulle's vision of Europe dependent in the future on French nuclear power. West German participation in an MLF leads in the opposite direction from the independent force and policy which de Gaulle envisions; a policy completely independent of the United States under French leadership and ultimate control.²⁶

French Premier Georges Pompidou spoke of MLF hostility, in November, 1964, declaring; ". . . we can ask ourselves if such a multilateral force is not destructive for Europe, provocative for certain other countries, and finally directed more or less against France."²⁷ In stressing

²⁴Herve Alphand, "Does France Have a Dilemma?" (Detroit: Economic Club of Detroit, February 24, 1964), pp. 9-10

²⁵The Washington Post, July 23, 1964.

²⁶The New York Times, August 9, 1964.

²⁷The Washington Post, November 7, 1964.

opposition against West German participation, he said:

If the multilateral force should end in the creation of a sort of German-American military alliance, we would not be able to consider such a result perfectly compatible with the relations which we maintain with the Federal Republic as they result from the Franco German Treaty. It would not be compatible either with our conception of the defense of Europe, nor with the idea that we, and also our opponents in Parliament have of the policy of European defense.²⁸

The same month, de Gaulle in a speech at Strasbourg summoned Europe to follow his lead and bring his vision to realization. He asked for ". . . The accomplishment in common with Germany of a great ambition, at once very ancient and very modern: The construction of a European-Europe. That is to say a Europe independent, powerful, and influential in the midst of a free world."²⁹

De Gaulle in essence expects the rest of Western Europe and in particular West Germany to be dependent on France in precisely the way he refuses to be dependent on the United States. To strengthen the argument, France voices the concern that a concept such as the MLF would start the Germans toward being a nuclear power, yet de Gaulle does not consider the fact that Germany wants the same equality France wants, but without an independent force. He has made it clear that in his view Europe should be organized and led by a Franco-German cooperation, but it seems in such a combination

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., November 23, 1964.

France would be the more equal of the two.

Paul-Henri Spaak has described the French President as having a sinister motive of seeking to hasten the departure of United States forces from Europe--a move de Gaulle claims is inevitable.

The void thus created might lead the other European countries to take refuge under the sheltering wings of France, which then alone could afford them some protection. This would be tantamount to a French hegemony in Europe, the achievement of the Gaullist grand design.³⁰

This design seeks an association of European nations wherein the bonds between partners are no closer than those which held the Triple Alliance together prior to 1914."³¹

Though opinions are divided on what de Gaulle's ultimate objective is, his actions to date regarding NATO and nuclear control within NATO seem clear.

France as a great nation must have its own nuclear deterrent--great countries have nuclear weapons. This deterrent must be independently controlled--France must have the ultimate decision along with the decision making authority, for to not have control, would mean American or NATO dominance. Integration of any sort means giving up sovereignty which de Gaulle regards as vital to France's national interests and honor. Though commitment to the North Atlantic Alliance with a nuclear umbrella provided by the United States has

³⁰Paul-Henri Spaak, "Hold Fast," Foreign Affairs, XLI (July, 1963), 611.

³¹Ibid., p. 619.

been a continuous thread in de Gaulle's policy, his non-support of NATO may eventually be his undoing. Quite possibly he has overreacted as he did in the summer of 1965 against the Common Market--only time and the French vote will tell. As noted, de Gaulle wants American protection without integration or United States dominance--in the words of Drew Middleton; ". . . he wants to have his cake and eat it too."³²

The United States, on the other hand, has a strong policy of offering protection, but with integration and without separate national nuclear forces. The MLF proposal as a NATO Nuclear Force was an attempt to bring this policy into reality and close the schism that was developing in NATO.

³²Drew Middleton, The Atlantic Community, A Study in Unity and Disunity (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1965), p. 67.

CHAPTER IV

UNITED STATES POLICY

From Campaign to Postponement

The spring of 1963 marked the beginning of the active promotional campaign for the MLF. At this point, United States diplomatic pressure was applied to bring as many NATO countries as possible to join discussions that were to commence in October. In general, the military aspects of the proposal were discussed in Washington, while the legal and political problems were handled by a working group in Paris. Initially, Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Greece and Turkey, with the Netherlands joining last, participated in the conferences. France refused any form of participation. These same countries less Belgium and later Turkey participated the following summer in mixed-manning of the USS Ricketts.

A year after the campaign had started, it was obvious that the United States was deeply committed to establishing a NATO multilateral force. In May, 1964, Under Secretary of State George Ball announced to a conference held at the Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, that the MLF should meet four conditions:

First, it should be assigned to NATO by all countries participating in the force. To meet this, we propose that it be collectively owned by the participants and that all participating nations share in the costs of creating, maintaining, and operating it.

Second, it should not be predominately based on the soil of any one nation. To meet this condition, we are proposing a sea-based force consisting of Polaris-type missiles mounted on surface warships. This force, deployed on the high seas, would operate outside the national limits of any state.

Third, it should be managed and operated by nationals of all participating countries under such conditions that it could not be withdrawn from the alliance to serve the national uses of any participating government. To meet this requirement, we propose that the ships themselves be manned by mixed crews of nationals of the participating nations.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense have concluded that an efficient first-class force can be created in this fashion. SACEUR has stated he would welcome the force as a significant addition to NATO's deterrent forces.

Fourth, the decision to fire the Polaris weapons should be a collective decision of the participating nations. One proposal is that political control be exercised through an executive body representing the participating nations. Obviously this control question is the heart of the matter. We are confident it can be solved.

In concluding, he stated that ". . . unless you gentlemen are able, out of the collected wisdom represented here, to come up with a better solution than the multilateral force, I strongly urge your support for that proposal."¹

By the fall of 1964, the proposal for the MLF had reached the point that a timetable was established for treaty signature by the end of 1964. But by this time, Britain had open misgivings on the subject which had the

¹George W. Ball, "U.S. Policy Toward NATO." NATO in Quest of Cohesion, Karl H. Cerny and Henry W. Briefs, editor (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 15-19.



effect of making the MLF appear as strictly a German-American venture. This helped to cause Franco-German relations as well as Franco-American relations to drop to a new low, and only added emphasis to the controversy.

Britain either decided to attempt a diversionary move or make a bid for some leadership in NATO by submitting a plan for mix manning of the existing strike aircraft and missiles in Europe.² The plan, eventually named the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) allowed the United States to reduce the pressure that had built up over the MLF. The President declared in a news conference on November 28, ". . . We want to work out with all nations, the free nations, the best solution possible. We are not going to be adamant in our attitudes."³ The following month, in a major speech at Georgetown University, the President tried to eliminate fears that relations among the countries making up the Atlantic Alliance had reached a crisis. Mr. Johnson declared, ". . . We come to reason, not to dominate. We do not seek to have our way, but to find a common way." He went on to stress proceeding "with due deliberation, with due respect for the interests of others and with an open door for those who may

²Alastair Buchan, The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective, The Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, Number Thirteen, (October, 1964), p.11.

³The Washington Post, November 29, 1964, Text of News Conference.



join later."⁴

After Prime Minister Wilson met with President Johnson in December, the United States position seemed clearer. It was a position that would provide flexibility for achieving the basic goals that the MLF was designed to attain. Both governments had agreed to the need for unity within the Atlantic Alliance. They agreed to cooperation in finding an equitable arrangement to satisfy the interests of other members, but within the framework of an American veto. The joint communique that was issued also called for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.⁵

Apparently, the United States accepted the British proposal of an ANF as a complement not as a replacement to MLF. This meant American policy could move out from under the criticism that the multilateral force was strictly a German-American venture designed to isolate France and give Germany nuclear weapons. By letting Great Britain proceed to bargain for their Atlantic Nuclear Force, the impression was given that American pressure was off and the burden for finding a new formula was shifted to the European side. The greater the show of increased British participation, the more the appearance of United States domination could be

⁴Ibid., December 4, 1964. Text of Georgetown University Speech.

⁵Ibid., December 9, 1964. Text of joint communique.

avoided. Thus also evading the stigma of a special German-American nuclear relationship which would help satisfy critics in NATO, as well as the Soviet Union, the United States could give the appearance of sitting back and listening while still tactfully leading from behind.

Many thought the final demise of the program had come in January, 1965, when the State Department closed down its MLF office and its Director, Gerard Smith, retired from Government service. Nonetheless, the Pentagon still maintains a section on MLF. And since that time, a great many pronouncements have been made that would indicate some interest for an MLF project or some variation of it still was being maintained in Washington up until the summer of 1966.

Secretary of State Rusk, in outlining the United States position on March 6, 1965, quoted the President as making the American position clear:

. . . we think it is highly important to develop arrangements within the Alliance that will provide an opportunity for the non-nuclear members to participate in their own defense, while avoiding the spread of national nuclear systems. I strongly hope in these talks there will be progress that will allow us to move on to fruitful multilateral discussions.⁶

W. W. Rostow, then chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council, reiterated this same theme in an address before The German Society for Foreign Affairs

⁶Dean Rusk, "Our Atlantic Policy." Department of State Press Release No. 39, March 6, 1965. "These talks" refer to Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Germany in March, 1965.

in Bonn on March 19, 1965, by stating:

. . . we have an opportunity to strengthen on a world basis the commitment to collective, rather than narrowly national, systems of defense. President Johnson has made it crystal clear that, so far as the United States is concerned, we are ready to go forward to make a truly integrated Atlantic force, in which nuclear and non-nuclear nations would participate on a basis of equality, leaving the door open for coordination within NATO for those members which may not wish to join such a force at this time, leaving the door open also to adjustments we might wish to make as Europe moves towards effective political unity. We remain convinced that it is in this direction the right answer lies in the critical matter of nuclear collaboration. If there is one area above others where we must maintain a deep understanding and a common front, it is in nuclear affairs: deterrence and arms control negotiations alike.⁷

In an unprecedented TV broadcast direct to the people of Europe via the new Early Bird Communications Satellite, President Johnson commemorated the 20th anniversary of V.E.-Day and made a major statement of American policy toward Europe. After indirectly criticizing President de Gaulle's "narrow nationalism" as destructive of Atlantic unity, the President alluded to the MLF/ANF by stating:

Fifth, we must work out more effective forms of common defense. All Atlantic nations who wish to do so have a right to share in collective nuclear defense while halting the spread of nuclear weapons.⁸

The President said that ". . . if one of us cannot join in a common venture, it will not stand in the way of the

⁷W.W. Rostow, "United States Policy Towards Europe." Department of State Press Release No. 51, March 19, 1965.

⁸The New York Times, May 8, 1965. Text of President Johnson's speech marking the 20th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe broadcast May 7 to Europe via Early Bird Communications Satellite.

rest of us."⁹ This indicated that the policy still existed almost a year ago and that those nations favoring it were to go ahead despite strong opposition by France and milder disapproval by other NATO nations.

In July, 1965, as publicity developed over the fact that the United States might seek a non proliferation treaty even at the expense of an Atlantic Nuclear Force, West German Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schroeder, dropped some hints in a newspaper interview that his country might have to acquire its own nuclear arms if an Atlantic nuclear deterrent or equivalent were not found to satisfy Bonn's security needs.¹⁰ Though the implications were denied some few days later by the German Socialist leader, Willy Brandt, as having no justification, it is hardly a coincidence that after a five month lapse, the Soviet Union suddenly agreed to resume disarmament talks in Geneva. Just prior to the disarmament talks, United States Presidential Envoy, Averell Harriman assured West German Chancellor Erhard "... that the United States efforts to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had not altered plans for a . . . multilateral

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ The Washington Post, July 11, 1965. This article ended with the report that Secretary of State Dean Rusk assured the West German Ambassador that the U.S. "will not sacrifice plans for a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force to an East-West non proliferation agreement."

nuclear force, the Atlantic Nuclear Force, or some similar arrangement."¹¹ Making good on the pronouncement, the United States draft treaty to the 17 nation Geneva disarmament conference, at the end of July, left a loop hole for a nuclear sharing proposal.

Whether or not this stand was a bargaining position, only time will tell. The fact is the United States has consistently stated its position which has remained firm throughout discussions on an anti-proliferation agreement--that is, not to subordinate the idea of an Atlantic nuclear force to the principle of non-proliferation. On the other hand, Great Britain appeared to want to explore the possibility further.

The then British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk in October of 1965, and the press reports at that time indicated that the British Labor Government wanted to give special scrutiny to anything that might impede agreement with the Soviet Union.¹² This same theme which was to include lengthy deliberation was carried out by Prime Minister Wilson in

¹¹Ibid., July 25, 1965.

¹²Ibid., October 12, 1965; James Reston put it in stronger words: "The British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, was even more explicit about putting a nuclear agreement with the Soviet Union before any nuclear organization within the Atlantic Alliance." The New York Times, October 15, 1965.

his visit to Washington in December. Naturally, language of this nature caused reactions in West Germany, and although progress had been made on Defense Secretary McNamara's proposal for a nuclear defense coordinating committee, (known as the McNamara Committee), the West German Government announced it was anxious to share in a nuclear weapons system and not just consultations.

As the visit of Chancellor Erhard to Washington in December, 1965, approached, public announcements both in Germany and the United States left little uncertainty as to what the Federal Republic would seek. The newly reelected Chancellor declared that NATO now must "adjust itself to new political and military conditions," Germany must have "a share in the nuclear defense in keeping with the extent of the danger and with the extent of the burdens."¹³ Bonn was convinced that the MLF or some variant of the concept would be a means to obtain this share and burden in nuclear matters. Speculation and conjecture grew as to how far President Johnson would go in satisfying West German demands. But, the pronouncement at the end of the visit simply alluded to the fact that there was a problem and that a search would continue for an acceptable formula in discussions between the two countries and other interested Allies. Both the Washington and

¹³The Washington Post, December 21, 1965, p. A6.

New York newspapers immediately declared the MLF/ANF ended.¹⁴ If the idea of such a nuclear force is abandoned why did the United States adopt it as a policy?

Why MLF as a United States Security Policy?

MLF was designed as a primary means to strengthen the unity within the Atlantic Alliance by resolving the differences that developed over the control of nuclear weapons. As time progressed, the non-nuclear nations wanted more of a say in the control over their destiny. The desire for equal status was bound to develop from national pride, from fear, from uncertainty, and from disagreement over doctrine and strategy established by the NATO nuclear powers. It was felt as pressure of this sort developed, the obvious alternative would make members of NATO either seek their own nuclear force, or if unable to do so, attempt neutralism. The possibility existed, (as it does today), that they might seek alignment elsewhere.

MLF was to provide the means for all members of the Alliance to participate closely in the ownership, control, and manning of a strong nuclear force. MLF was designed to act as an alternative to unnecessary, expensive, militarily superfluous, and politically divisive independent nuclear forces.

¹⁴ Ibid., December 23, 1965; "Nuclear Force Burial Clears Air," The Washington Star, December 23, 1965; "Idea of Mixed-Manned Nuclear Fleet Dies Quietly After 5 years of Debate," The New York Times, December 23, 1965.

By acting as an alternative to national forces, MLF was considered to be an anti-proliferation device as it would not involve transferring control of nuclear weapons into the hands of any one state. Control arrangements that were envisioned would mean the force could only be fired by decision of its governing body on which all members would be represented and over which the United States was to have a veto. It was possible for MLF to add nothing to the total nuclear weapons that were programmed, therefore it could easily have been accommodated to a freeze level of weapons restriction. Necessary production could easily replace existing obsolete weapons. The force was to be subject to the same safeguards that other NATO nuclear forces presently are under, so as to prevent any use in an accidental or unauthorized manner.

Actually, a sea-borne force would be more secure under multilateral arrangements than the present European land-based missiles. Under the present bilateral arrangement all national crews operate the missile with American control of the warheads assured only by attending American personnel and electronic links. The 40 per cent rule would prevent all national crews from complete control, and the governing body made up of all participating members would control the permissive links needed to release the weapons with United States concurrence.

The fear that the United States might someday take

Western Europe into a nuclear holocaust against its wishes would be allayed. Conversely, the anxiety that the United States might, in the future, withdraw its nuclear weapons from the defense of Europe would be satisfied. MLF would prevent the United States from withdrawing the weapons covering Soviet MRDM targets without the consent of all the members. Access to American nuclear planning, operations, and targeting, which MLF would provide as an integrated force, would also assure its allies that, in fact, American nuclear weapons are committed to the defense of Europe and would remain committed. The participation in allied strategy would not only give the members confidence and reassurance, but it would provide experience and a thorough understanding of the responsibilities that go with being a nuclear power. By being aware of how target assessments and assignments are made, it would encourage an awareness by the member of the need for a realistic balance between conventional and nuclear forces.¹⁵ The present military situation calls for such a balance which the United States and SACEUR have stressed.

MLF would meet the requirement for a modern defensive nuclear deterrent needed to counter the extensive number of Soviet MRBMs in Russia capable of reaching the NATO area.

¹⁵ John Newhouse, "The Multilateral Force: An Appraisal," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (September, 1964), 14.

The advantages of not having to place a major number of missiles on the Continent to meet this threat are obvious. The missiles, to be of any worth, would have to be mobile--the mechanics of which would be a major undertaking. The conspicuousness of a large number of mobile missiles would create psychological problems as well as sabotage problems. The sea-borne force would give mobility without being an awesome presence in the density of the European land mass.

Another goal for MLF was the attraction it should have provided for the present independent nuclear forces of Great Britain and France. As already seen, the British proposal of an ANF provided an alternative to Great Britain to give up its expensive national force. It was hoped both powers could merge their forces with the MLF and by assigning a large portion of the costs of their weapons to the program, make a tremendous savings.¹⁶ Although France did not wish to join, the hope was that if some form of MLF did materialize with Great Britain's participation, France would be left isolated and therefore, might eventually join--this naturally was pure conjecture and would probably not occur until after the de Gaulle reign. Advocates of MLF felt that to not support MLF because of France, left only the alternatives of doing nothing or supporting de Gaulle's nuclear politics. The result would lead to a

¹⁶Ibid.

serious division in the Alliance over the German problem and possibly to the eventuality of a German nuclear force.

The design was to bring the members of the Alliance together through cooperation, coordination, and unity, in operating a major nuclear force. It was to be an advanced force of a major political military importance which would have the psychological advantage of confronting the Soviet Union with a cohesive, unified nuclear deterrent. There was even hope that the force might well have acted as the persuasive lever to convince the Soviet Union to give up the arms race. But the problem today is that the Soviet threat is no longer given much stature by many of the NATO members.

Many critics of MLF have attacked the force on the basis that it was redundant and inefficient. It must be granted that the military functions of MLF can be equally well performed by Polaris submarines and Minutemen, but this in itself does not make MLF redundant or ineffective. By acting as a substitute alone this argument is answered. From a purely economic point of view, the sharing of cost by Allies can be well accepted by the United States.

From an entirely different approach and a point that will have to be taken into consideration in greater amounts is the emergence of China as a nuclear power. The United States nuclear force structure will undoubtedly have to expand as Communist China's nuclear capability grows. MLF could well ease the burden by assuming a deterrent role

against Russia, thus releasing ICBM's and Polaris as well, for targeting against China.

Often the MLF is criticized as being too vulnerable a target. Amitai Etzioni, who is a sharp critic of MLF, reported hearing that a Pentagon war game performed for West Germany showed the forces to have a greater chance for survival than land-based ICBM's. Etzioni said, "it showed that after a first strike, only one-third of the land-based Minutemen would survive, while 80 percent of the MLF ships would survive."¹⁷ Though this might have been a "sales pitch" to convince West German military leaders, it is only necessary to look at the environment in which MLF would operate to realize that destruction would be difficult.

The ships were to operate in three to four million square miles of ocean. Configuration was to be similar to many ships in the area. For example, in the Mediterranean Sea alone, upwards on one thousand ships of all kinds can be found on any given day.¹⁸ It would be a difficult task to keep all these ships identified constantly and thereby know exactly which ship was to be destroyed. The enemy

¹⁷"Multilateral Force or Farce?" New York Times Magazine (December 13, 1964) p. 25. Etzioni and Herman Kahn, a supporter of MLF, conducted a discussion on MLF moderated by Hanson Baldwin, Military Editor of the New York Times.

¹⁸Thomas W. Connolly, "The Ballistic Missile Surface Force" United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XC (June, 1964), 43.

problem is an age old one: detection, identification, conversion, and finally kill.

Once the problem of detecting and identifying the missile ship is solved, then this information must be converted into an effective attack. This takes time and in the process the ship has moved and probably launched its missiles. In addition, even merchant ships have a certain inherent nuclear hardness to other than direct hits.¹⁹ The ship's missiles can probably be launched even if the vessels were dead in the water and in the process of sinking. Enemy considerations and forces must therefore insure complete destruction, which raises his force ability and requirements to accomplish such a feat.

MLF is often compared to United States strategic forces with the idea that first MLF would always be used in connection with American strikes, and therefore only contribute less than 10 per cent in striking power. Two hundred missiles are considered to be a minor force in comparison to the United States damage limiting forces. But when comparing MLF with Russian missiles threatening the United States today, the force is more formidable. When related to the Soviet Union's IRBM's and MRBM's targeted on Europe, which are estimated to be between 500-800 missiles, the MLF still has a damage limiting role as a second strike

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 43-44.

weapon because of integration with American strikes. This, of course, presupposes the United States will live up to its pronounced policies. Nevertheless, MLF's role of deterrence would be formidable since its capability has been estimated at being able to destroy between twenty-five and 100 Soviet cities.²⁰ Would the Soviet Union consider this cost too high in risking any aggression? This, after all, is the role of deterrence. Can the Soviet Union count on an American veto or must it take into consideration the chance that the United States will back its guarantee?

The question of credibility has created a great debate, but it seems that the question of a veto arising is dismissed from the United States view point. Europe is dependent on the United States deterrent and will be for many years to come. It seems inconceivable that Europe could become involved in a nuclear war without United States participation, and any situation that involves the United States in a nuclear war would also involve the use of MLF. The question of credibility becomes involved only in relation to a first strike in answer to a conventional Soviet attack. For, if the Soviet Union uses nuclear weapons first, there is no doubt, or at least the Soviet Union cannot doubt, that the West would use nuclear weapons in return, regardless of MLF.

But is credibility actually in question with regard

²⁰"Multilateral Force or Farce", op. cit., p. 25.

to a first strike in response to a Soviet conventional attack? First, it is not necessary to consider MLF as a first strike weapon. Undoubtedly, if the decision is made to conduct a nuclear response to a conventional attack, the weapons utilized will probably be of the small tactical field-type. MLF was to be held in reserve to deter the Soviet Union from using the MRBM force targeted on Western Europe. The decision on the use of the multilateral force, which would be a part of the West's total nuclear forces, would not be made independent of the American decision to use the majority of its tactical and strategic weapons. Credibility, therefore, is dismissed as an argument against MLF on the grounds that MLF neither is less credible nor is it more credible than the existing nuclear forces.

The whole idea of MLF was to give the Europeans a greater role in planning, coordination, consultation, and the decision making-process of the American nuclear decisions. It seems in any event that the Europeans would not authorize the use of MLF without American approval regardless of a United States veto. By tying into the American forces the Europeans are guaranteed that, first the United States will not pull out of Europe, and secondly, the United States cannot take them into a nuclear war without their representation. This then is the principal advantage over national nuclear forces which the MLF was designed to replace.

National forces can only cause the United States to

back away from Europe by the fear that independent action could precipitate a nuclear war against American will. National forces will not permit other European nations any representation and therefore the losses to unity and common defense would be considerable. American presence in Europe on the forward line guarantees United States response, but if the growth of independent forces is allowed to continue, the United States may well pull out of Europe. In other words, an MLF concept helps to guarantee United States presence, national nuclear forces will tend to remove American guarantees. It is more likely that the Soviet Union would be prone to undertake armed aggression if only independent national forces were the restraining motive; how much restraint, after all, can a force of 62 vulnerable bombers muster?

Nonetheless, the European argument must be taken into consideration. So much is at stake when it comes to nuclear war that countries feel it is in their vital interest to be able to control nuclear power. Different national interests are not only involved within the NATO area, but in extra European concerns as well. Each country, due to geographic location alone, has a different outlook on strategy. These, then, are problems that are present and must be investigated in seeking the answers to the question: Was and is MLF a valid national security policy?

CHAPTER V

OTHER KEY COUNTRY POSITIONS

Federal Republic of Germany

Of all the countries involved with the MLF, Germany is the strongest supporter and proponent of a mixed-manned fleet. Most sources indicate that all levels of German society were and are not particularly motivated toward the development of an independent nuclear force or national ownership of nuclear weapons; nevertheless, German leadership was vitally interested in joining the MLF for a number of reasons.

The primary reason can be attributed to the geographic location of West Germany and its division. Understandably, West Germany is extremely sensitive to the number of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles aimed at Western Europe. Since the installation of the Soviet missiles, SACEUR has consistently called for an effective counterforce. Militarily, the Soviet missiles can be and are covered by other means, but the psychological advantage of an allied force in which Germany could play a major role is obvious.

A second major reason for strong support is the link it would create with the United States, both defensively and politically. Germany is wholly dependent on the United States and the Western Alliance for defensive support; she feels any withdrawal of this support would be disastrous. MLF would definitely tie the United States and its nuclear

weapons to the defense of Germany. Politically, the MLF would be a means of influencing the United States and, since Germany would be a major contributor, she would have a certain leverage over American military strategy and foreign policy.

Third, the United States campaign for an MLF project was pushed hard in regards to Germany with most of the opposition acquiescing. The Pentagon conducted war games for German observers in an effort to convince them of the military value and survivability of a surface force after a first strike had been received.¹ The strongest opposition came from the Bavarian Christian Socialist leaders Franz Strauss and Karl Guttenberg. Guttenberg supported the idea of an independent European force while Strauss, not completely rejecting MLF, envisioned a "two pillar" system of defense linking Europe and the United States in a common strategy. Both were heavy supporters of de Gaulle and were referred to as German Gaullists, though lately a certain disillusionment has become apparent because of de Gaulle's tactics. Strauss, nonetheless, still believes in an independent European defense as does de Gaulle, but on a supranational basis.²

¹"Multilateral Force or Farce?", The New York Times Magazine, December 13, 1964.

²The Washington Post, December 6, 1964; Drew Middleton, The Atlantic Community (New York: David Mc Kay Company, Inc., 1965), p. 132.

West German long-term goals can be listed as the desire for reunification, European unity, and Atlantic solidarity. MLF was considered to be one device to help them attain these objectives by creating a close and durable relationship with the United States. The most pressing objective is the reunification of Germany and through the United States Bonn envisioned persuading Russia to give up East Germany.³ West European unity might well assist in attracting Eastern Europe as it already has in the economic sphere, but the trend toward unity is likely to be a slow process because of France's disruptive role.

The pressure France has maintained against Germany has had a divisive effect on unity as well as German support for MLF. De Gaulle's tactics appear to be almost forcing Chancellor Erhard to choose sides between the United States and France. There is no doubt, that if it came to a showdown, at this time, Germany would choose the United States. By agreeing to the grain issue in the Common Market, and in conducting lengthy discussions with France, Germany has attempted to hold Franco-American relations together, but de Gaulle continues to keep relations strained. In 1965, French moves toward Russia and the East certainly alarmed

³ Gerhard Schroder, "Germany Looks at Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, XLIV (October, 1965), 19. "No German government, constitutionally sworn as it is to act on behalf of all Germans and to restore German unity, could abandon the policy of reunification."

Germany.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's statements on departing Paris at the end of April, 1965, implied that France might recognize East Germany. Although the French Foreign Ministry corrected the implication by stating that France did not intend to recognize East Germany, German fears have probably not been allayed; especially when this is coupled with de Gaulle's feelings and pronouncements that the German problem is a European problem. Consequently, Chancellor Erhard who faced elections in September, 1965, asked de Gaulle to move ahead his scheduled visit in June of that year. He undoubtedly requested assurances on France's policies toward both the Soviet Union and Germany.⁴ The visit was advanced in an obvious move by de Gaulle to alter the deteriorating Franco-German relations. Germany, after all, could turn to the United States and Great Britain for greater support, and this was not in de Gaulle's interest.

Prime Minister Wilson's visit to West Germany in March, 1965, reaffirmed Britain's commitment to the security of Berlin. Wilson stated that negotiations on the multi-lateral force would continue at the Paris working group level. The Prime Minister affirmed that it was "important to try to maintain momentum" on this project.⁵ Although

⁴The Washington Post, May 11, 1965.

⁵Ibid., March 10, 1965.

Germany favors an MLF concept and Britain an ANF project, both countries appeared to be willing to work on a compromise solution.

Germany continues to build its overall strength, and is the principal European contributor to NATO's conventional military posture, but someday its lack of real participation in nuclear weapons will have to be solved. One need only return to the inter-war period to realize that Germany cannot be held as a second-class power or junior partner in relation to France and Great Britain. France has opposed any German participation in a NATO nuclear force for obvious reasons. The reasoning goes that membership would impede European political unity, thus preventing a European force--at least in de Gaulle's eyes, this is probably very true. In support of this thesis, both Henry Kissinger and Alastair Buchan, noted authors on NATO and nuclear strategy, have voiced the opinion that the reason the United States campaigned so hard for MLF was to block the possibility of a Franco-German force.⁶

The French idea of a European force which has never clearly been outlined, except that it would be under French leadership and her allies would contribute financial and

⁶ Alastair Buchan, The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, Number Thirteen, October 1964), p. 11; Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York: Mc Graw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 128.

industrial support, has not provided much attraction for West Germany. This idea simply shifts the country's position out from under American leadership to under French domination and gives Germany less power in the process. The plan might fit into de Gaulle's vision of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," but it offers less to Germany than her present association with NATO and close ties to the United States.

Yet Germany must rely on cooperation with both States, French policies have made this a difficult task. Germany must rely on the Atlantic Alliance and the American deterrent. In Europe she relies on France as a European neighbor, ally and supplier of agricultural needs, but she cannot afford to rely on an independent national force of France. For in Raymond Aron's words: "In the next fifteen years no independent national deterrent will have a security value equal to the presence of American troops on European soil and to the strength of the American commitment that results from it."⁷

The Federal Republic of Germany which has been a strong supporter of European unification and greater integration within the Atlantic Alliance has received the following and similar pronouncements from Washington with

⁷
Raymond Aron, The Great Debate, trans. Ernst Pawel (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 261.

favor:

We in Washington have learned how powerfully the nuclear problem shapes political attitudes within nations and among nations. We think further fragmentation of our nuclear capabilities and policies will weaken the Alliance and its foundations. On the other hand, we are confident that a decision to go forward with the MLF will serve as the basis for greater unity in the Alliance, not merely in the field of military policy itself but in the field of arms control and in other areas.

Nations joined in an integrated nuclear venture are bound to be drawn closer together in ways that none of us can now fully foresee. They will have to determine common positions on arms control negotiations affecting this venture; they will be taking part in such negotiations as countries with a tangible stake in the outcome, not as bystanders. They will have to consult closely about the conditions under which the force would be placed in a state of alert or used, and this will inevitably involve them in intimate consultation about a variety of political situations, which bear upon the availability or use of nuclear weapons.

In short, in deciding whether to go forward with the MLF we are deciding not merely how to share nuclear power; we are taking decisions which will influence the future political organization of the West. We are choosing between national approaches and a new step toward integration in the deepest sense of the word.⁸

One of the main objects in the MLF approach was the desire of the United States to seek to discourage national nuclear forces and avoid proliferation with the reasoning, this did not add to collective defense. This logic has been accepted by West Germany. In Foreign Affairs, Fritz Erler has written:

⁸ W.W. Rostow, "Europe and the Atlantic Alliance," address before the Assembly of Western European Union, June 24, 1964, United States Department of State Press Release No. 292, p. 6.

It has been a Western aim to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The British attempt to give up its existing nuclear arsenal must therefore be welcomed, but it makes sense only if we replace national by community solutions. The French example would lead to nuclear weapons for everybody. No responsible German wants national nuclear weapons for Germany; but in a world where every nation would have them, it would be impossible to exclude forever one country alone without creating feelings of frustration that would lead to violent nationalism. Therefore Germany advocates a community solution within the Alliance. For years I have urged that the European partners in NATO be given a share in planning, in deciding on common strategy, in preparing future weapons developments and similar matters, leaving the ultimate decision on the use of nuclear weapons in the hands of the President of the United States, acting as trustee for the alliance but basing his decision on a commonly agreed strategy. The Multilateral Nuclear Force was a second-best alternative to the simpler solution of giving every partner in NATO--provided he is making a fair contribution to the conventional field--a say in the nuclear part of the strategy too. Since no government took up this proposal, the MLF, with its features of common ownership and financing was a step in the right direction. A community solution might take other forms, but any solution must serve the community and not be simply bilateral. If Europe achieves unification, its participation in the common defense could be integrated with that of the United States; but it could not replace it.⁹

Great Britain

The British position also favors a community approach to the nuclear problem within NATO. One of the main themes that resulted from the talks between Prime Minister Wilson and President Johnson in December, 1964, was an agreement to develop strength through unity in nuclear defense. At this meeting, the British obviously offered to assume or agreed to take the initiative in attempting to solve the nuclear

⁹ Fritz Erler, "The Alliance and the Future of Germany," Foreign Affairs, XLIII (April, 1965), 442-43.

issue. French hostility to the MLF had become extreme causing Franco-German relations as well as Franco-American relations to reach new lows. At this point, President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson must have thought a shift in leadership regarding nuclear plans might improve the situation. In spite of this, the communique that was issued appeared to leave the door open on any plan that would serve the legitimate interest of the members of the Alliance as long as it prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons and contained existing safeguards.¹⁰

The United States envisioned the British plan (ANF) as Britain's contribution to an enlarged MLF concept and as a means of erasing her independent force as pledged by the Labor Party prior to the election of 1964. The British position also included an insistence on a continued United States veto and a clause in a treaty commitment for participating members not to acquire national atomic weapons.¹¹

Great Britain's proposal would accomplish a number of important purposes. One, Britain would retain its traditional balance of power role in European affairs. By contributing part of its existing V-Bombers and to-be-built Polaris submarines, Germany's major role and dominance would be offset.

¹⁰The Washington Post, December 9, 1964. Text of Joint communique.

¹¹Ibid., December 12, 1964.

Second, the cost of participation by this contribution would be much lower than in joining the new proposed fleet. Third, the Labor Government, by getting rid of its national nuclear force, might satisfy its anti-nuclear opponents and the political "ban the bomb" element. Fourth, ever since de Gaulle's veto of British membership in the Common Market, Great Britain has been looking off and on at some way of forming a closer relationship with the Continent.

Thus, the British interest in MLF/ANF appeared to be military, political, and financial. British participation in the MLF would create a tie to the continent that both Great Britain and the United States think is necessary to lay a basis for further political unity and cooperation.

Prime Minister Wilson's visit to West Germany in March of 1965 along with the Queen's visit in May were both indications that Great Britain wanted an eventual close tie to Europe and both trips undoubtedly softened a traditional anti-German image of the Labor Party.

The British position in supporting an ANF proposal was partly influenced by economic considerations. Existing forces would be cheaper, and Britain insisted on a clause permitting temporary withdrawal in case of an emergency east of Suez. If temporary withdrawal is not permitted then probably the British government would reserve portions of its

Bomber Command from assignment to NATO.¹² The ANF then envisioned using existing forces which were to be assigned to NATO control with safeguards on a mixed-manned basis in the control system, rather than in the forces.

British policy vis-a-vis NATO has been to increase its strength and tie Great Britain as well as the United States to Europe in a greater relationship, rather than in a lesser role which France proposes. As a matter of fact, the political backing that Wilson has given the United States in regards to Viet Nam is unprecedented for a Labor Government. But of course, Britain is committed to the defense of Malaysia, which would probably come under undue pressure if the United States abandoned Southeast Asia. Primarily, though, Great Britain is desirous of maintaining its "special relationship" with the United States.

Though Wilson stated the prospects for an Atlantic Nuclear Force looked good after his visit to Germany in March of 1965, progress was slow.¹³ Nonetheless, the Prime Minister was convinced there can be no effective independent nuclear power outside the United States and the Soviet Union. In an opening address at the NATO Foreign Ministers' Conference in London in May, 1965, Wilson reaffirmed the

¹² Sir John Slessor "Atlantic Nuclear Policy," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, III (Spring, 1965), 61-62.

¹³ The Washington Post, March 7, 1965.

need for the Alliance and stated, ". . . no nation, however great, can think in terms of going it alone, without allies and without regard to world opinion."¹⁴

Soviet Union

Soviet opposition to the MLF appears to take two predominant forms. First, they claim it would open the way to German acquisition of nuclear weapons. Second, they stress it would set in motion the process of nuclear proliferation.¹⁵

The first theme is aimed at an emotional appeal to those countries that fear a strong and powerful Germany. By raising anti-German feelings, the Kremlin hoped to create enough opposition to defeat MLF. In stressing the nuclear proliferation thesis, they hoped to play world opinion against the United States. This line also gives the Soviet Union an excuse on disarmament talks or a strengthened bargaining position by claiming MLF would complicate disarmament talks.

As the plans and talks on MLF increased throughout 1964, Soviet opposition increased and became more threatening. The Soviet Union sent a note to the United States on July 11, 1964, threatening ". . . severe and perhaps irreparable

¹⁴Ibid., May 11, 1965.

¹⁵Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Moscow and the MLF: Hostility and Ambivalence", Foreign Affairs, XLIII (October, 1964), 126.

consequences."¹⁶ In November, Moscow warned it would take countermeasures to insure the security of the Communist world if the projected multilateral force was set up. In following their general theme, the statement described the MLF as a bid by West German "revenge seekers" to gain access to nuclear weapons and declared it would be ". . . blindness not to see that additional obstacles would appear to disarmament which would be difficult to overcome . . .".¹⁷

In an appeal to world opinion on December 7, 1964, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko introduced a memorandum before the United Nations on disarmament calling for ". . . prevention of such further proliferation of nuclear weapons as the MLF would bring."¹⁸ A week later Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki, in a policy speech before the U.N. General Assembly, declared MLF, ". . . would upset the equilibrium between the two sides--if not necessarily the military balance, then decisively the political one." He went on to voice a vague threat by stating, ". . . no one can expect that the Socialist countries could then refrain from taking appropriate countermeasures."¹⁹

¹⁶ Ibid. For the U.S. answer see "U.S. Reaffirms Position on NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force," The Department of State Bulletin, LI (September 14, 1964), 367-68.

¹⁷ The Washington Post, November 15, 1964.

¹⁸ Ibid., December 3, 1964.

¹⁹ Ibid., December 15, 1964.

The Soviet motives for defeating the MLF can be clearly seen in historical context. Russia has a traditional fear of a mighty Germany. In World War I and in World War II she lost millions of her populace to Germany; naturally then, anything that would increase German power would be against her interests. Any development in Western unity, which the Soviet Union recognizes MLF would be, is not within the wishes of Eastern Europe. Foreign Minister Rapacki made this point very clear in his pronouncement.

On the other hand, the Soviets must realize that a defeat for MLF could mean a campaign by West Germany for its own nuclear force or an alignment with France in a Franco-German nuclear power bloc. The defeat of the EDC in 1954, with the immediate rearmament of West Germany to fill the power vacuum, is an excellent example of what might happen in the future.²⁰

Thus, the Soviet Union is placed in an unusual position. The defeat of MLF might create a Franco-German nuclear force or an independent German force in proximity. On the other hand, if MLF were to go through, it would help to create Western unity which would be a competitor power bloc even stronger than the present NATO. With Moscow in this position, it would appear unlikely that any agreement to MLF would create any serious confrontation, and the

²⁰Brzezinski, op. cit., 133.

vague threats that have been made are without a strong basis, they might well be only a propaganda device. The very fact that there is strong Soviet opposition can be interpreted to mean that Moscow sees the MLF as a strong and credible deterrent.

After the United States' open campaign for MLF was dropped suddenly in December, 1964, the Soviet Union's anti-MLF declarations subsided. On January 24, 1965, Pravda announced that NATO powers "including West Germany are losing interest in the idea."²¹ Whether this view is held by Soviet officials is hard to say. But it made an excellent propaganda tool for Russia to use on East Europe's easily stirred fears of Germany. In this manner, the Soviet Union could assume the role of protector in attempts to regain lost influence in Eastern Europe.

Even neutral Finland was apparently pressured into making a statement against MLF. At the end of February, 1965, on a visit to Moscow, the Finnish President said that Finns "cannot help considering" the Soviet Union's outlook on the MLF; then he announced that the MLF "plans worry us."²²

Of course, the Soviet Union's rapprochement with France will be utilized to the fullest in the future to conduct fierce campaigns against a revival of plans for

²¹The Washington Post, January 25, 1965.

²²Ibid., February 23, 1965.

nuclear control in NATO. French independence will be encouraged in hopes that France will pull out of the Alliance completely, thus further weakening Western defense. Each has given the other support in the United Nations on the financial issue, and together they oppose United States actions in Viet Nam as they did the Dominican Republic. Therefore, there is good reason to believe Paris and Moscow would join in strong opposition to any future MLP/ANF plans.

CHAPTER VI

THE CENTRAL PROBLEM--NUCLEAR CONTROL

Separate National Security Interests and Strategy

Besides the basic matter of keeping the Alliance together, the issue of control of nuclear weapons is probably the greatest problem facing NATO today. Because NATO is an alliance of sovereign states who want to maintain control over their separate destinies, the problem is not only central, but extremely difficult to solve. A basic conflict of interest and difference in geographic location creates a lack of strategic consensus (consensus on alliance strategy) which lies at the base of the problem of nuclear control.

The United States strategy of "flexible response" is by no means wholly accepted by Europeans. The American strategy is envisioned by Europeans as allowing a conventional war to be conducted on their territory with the nuclear option withheld until absolutely needed--an option they have no control over. Once the nuclear option is utilized, they can visualize a limited nuclear war being conducted in their dense territory; the resulting destruction, they feel, would be as great as a total nuclear war, while the United States and Russia possibly remain privileged sanctuaries. Thus, Europeans tend to favor a massive retaliation strategy as more in their interest, but even here each country has a different concept.

Germany, as a forward line country nearest to the threat, favors a forward strategy with an immediate response at the border with tactical nuclear weapons. As Kai-Uwe von Hassel, the West German Defense Minister, said in January, 1965:

The concept of flexible response in Europe--both political and military--must not be interpreted to mean that the so-called atomic threshold can be raised unduly high, without reference to political considerations. Apart from the fact that this would lead the potential aggressor to think that he could calculate his risk, it would create a situation in which he could seize pawns for future negotiations.

In order to prevent this, atomic demolition mines, nuclear air defense weapons and, if need be, nuclear battlefield weapons must be made ready for employment in an early phase of a recognizable attack on Europe.¹

Germany, as noted earlier, considers MLF both "militarily useful and politically extremely valuable."² Here Germany wants a say in the control of nuclear weapons without national ownership and feels a community solution will accomplish this purpose.

France of course is completely opposed to this view. French strategy rules out relying on conventional defense with a nuclear back-up. Immediate massive retaliation is seen as the only alternative to Soviet aggression. Even tactical nuclear warfare is discarded on the grounds that

¹Kai-Uwe von Hassel, "Organizing Western Defense," Foreign Affairs, XLIII (January, 1965), 211.

²Ibid., p. 213.

even if invasion were prevented, " . . . it could not protect the Europeans from destruction."³ The force de frappe, which is designed to support French strategy, is targeted in a counter-city role because it is felt the only objectives that have a deterrent value are demographic. Though France points with pride to its nuclear power, she admits that the force de frappe supports a strategy of "minimum deterrence" by stating: "The French Government is convinced of the moderating and even discouraging effect that the existence of a deterrent force, even a small one, must have on the undertakings of a possible aggressor."⁴ If this deterrent does not work then the object is " . . . to strike the designated enemy targets within the shortest possible time with nuclear explosives."⁵

Great Britain supports United States strategy, except, that generally the view is held, that once even tactical nuclear weapons are used, escalation to all-out nuclear war will occur. The United States strategy of "graduated response" calls for nuclear weapons being used in a controlled

³ Carl Anno, "Nuclear Control and the Multilateral Force," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XCI (April, 1965), 27, citing General Allieret Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces.

⁴ French Embassy, The First Five Years of the Fifth Republic of France, January, 1959-January, 1964 (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division, [n.d.] , p. 19.

⁵ Ibid., p. 29.

and selected manner once the decision is reached to utilize the nuclear option. "The British believe that early atomic blows are needed to resist Russia and any use of nuclear weapons would make escalation to general war 'virtually unavoidable'." ⁶

The Labor Government sees little value in maintaining an independent deterrent which has proved expensive and not much of a deterrent. Defense Minister Denis Healy has said:

To maintain the fiction of an independent British deterrent is undermining the solidarity of NATO It decreases America's readiness to trust in Europe and Europe's readiness to trust in the United States.... ⁷

Thus Great Britain is a supporter of some form of nuclear control within NATO. As noted earlier, their proposal involves the concept of national forces within an Atlantic Nuclear Force. As a strong supporter of NATO providing for common defense, Great Britain feels, as does the United States, that there exists a real need to come up with a solution to the nuclear control problem.

It can be seen that just amongst four powers, three of which are nuclear, there is a different outlook on strategy. This makes solutions to the control problem extremely difficult. A strategic consensus might never be achieved. What is important is that the unity of NATO be maintained

⁶Amme, op. cit., 26.

⁷Ibid., 27.

because, as Sir John Slessor has said, "United, the Communists can never defeat us; divided we bid fair to defeat ourselves."⁸ In the final analysis the unity and strength of NATO is the strongest bulwark in existence against the expansion of Communist power.

The MLF concept was an attempt by the United States to create a system that would provide for the needed close association of Allies in the planning, decision-making, and implementation of nuclear policy within a NATO context. At least MLF was an attempt in the right direction. Steps are needed to achieve a closer unity in the Atlantic Alliance. If NATO is allowed to disintegrate because of narrow nationalism on both sides of the Atlantic, then this would be a major political and military loss not only to the national security of the United States, but to the West as a whole. None other than the Soviet Union would be more pleased, since this has been their object--to undermine and divide NATO at every opportunity. Division will cause a weakness in power and to supplement this weakness nations will turn automatically to a greater source of might and prestige--nuclear weapons.

Proliferation--The Nth Country Problem

There appears to be a general international consensus against the proliferation of nuclear weapons as evidenced by

⁸Sir John Slessor, "Atlantic Nuclear Policy," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, III (Spring, 1965), 57.

the sixty-six nation 1959 United Nations General Assembly Resolution. It asks that "the powers producing nuclear weapons...refrain from handing over the control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them."⁹ This international consensus is further expressed in the widespread formal adherence to the Test Ban Treaty, (excepting France and China). Despite such an international consensus there is still the possibility of nations aspiring to gain the status of the "Nuclear Club."

The United States is opposed to the further spread of nuclear weapons to powers not possessing them and is especially opposed to any independent nuclear forces within NATO. There are at least some three dozen countries in the world that are conducting nuclear energy programs. Within NATO, there are at least four countries which have the capability to produce nuclear weapons with their own resources--Canada, Belgium, Italy, and West Germany. Denmark and the Netherlands are probably very close to having a similar capability.¹⁰ It is only necessary to look at the progress of France and China to realize how the attainment of nuclear power can be achieved.

⁹Raymond H. Dawson, "What Kind of NATO Nuclear Force," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLI (January, 1964), 32.

¹⁰Helmut Schmidt, Defense or Retaliation: A German View, trans. Edward Thomas (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 40.

In examining the reasons for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, one must understand the motivating factors which have encouraged states to undertake the expensive effort necessary to create an independent nuclear force. Among those motivating pressures, in regards to NATO, are found two major problem areas: lack of consensus on alliance strategy and doubts as to the credibility of the United States guarantee.

In addition, there is the motivation of status and international prestige, especially in relation to the other nuclear powers. As George Liska has written:

National control over a nuclear asset strengthens a country's position in cold-war diplomacy. It increases the likelihood of the country's inclusion and strengthens its voice in serious negotiations. And it increases its ability to frustrate separate negotiations.¹¹

Further, there is a definite desire to be in on the vital decisions concerning the use of such weapons. Britain's special status is an example which tends to indicate that possessing nuclear weapons will assure a voice in critical decisions. These then appear to be some of the major pressures causing nations to seek an independent force: the desire for a part in decisions, planning, negotiations, and absolute control over weapons of mass destruction. After all, "...NATO is an Alliance of sovereign states who want to

¹¹George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 157.

maintain control over their individual destinies."¹²

What was MLF designed to do to forestall further proliferation of nuclear weapons within NATO? Gerard Smith, who headed up the State Department's MLF office, until it was disbanded, felt that MLF would bring about closer integration within the Alliance in the strategic nuclear area and thus dampen enthusiasm for national forces.¹³

In turning to the question of credibility as it affects proliferation, a basic conflict develops and it is a problem that will be difficult to solve. The problem is: A credible force adequate in the eyes of Western Europe requires proliferation in the form of reconstituting NATO as a nuclear power in its own right. Any force which is not credible in the eyes of the Europeans finds difficulty matching the appeal of an independent nuclear force. This is the dilemma in setting up a control mechanism which will discourage proliferation in the form of national independent forces, but which, at the same time, is not a form of proliferation itself--a point the Soviets never fail to bring up.

The particularly peculiar situation of West Germany must be investigated before concluding. It is with regard to West Germany that European governments are most fearful of

¹²Amme, loc. cit.

¹³G. C. Smith, "Problems of Foreign Policy in Connection with the Nuclear Defense of Nato," Department of State, press release, No. 178 (April 22, 1964), p. 12.

nuclear proliferation. The Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations are especially sensitive to any control over nuclear weapons by the West German Government. This also, undoubtedly is one of the reasons de Gaulle is so adamantly against MLF. Regardless of the way one approaches MLF, it appears primarily directed at giving some semblance of control over nuclear forces and influence in nuclear policy to the German Federal Republic. It is assumed West Germany is desirous of such control and influence, though there is considerable debate as to whether there is German interest in an independent force, and if so, to what extent. In this regard, Alastair Buchan has attacked the foundations of the MLF concept by writing:

Moreover, the scheme seems to me to be animated by a false hypothesis, namely that Germany will decide to become an independent nuclear power unless she shortly acquires some share in the physical control of nuclear weapons. Such a fear, which overlooks the formidable technical, legal, and political difficulties which would confront Germany in making such a decision rests on American misreading of German apprehension and requirements.¹⁴

Nonetheless, although Germany has adhered to the treaty provisions forbidding the development of nuclear weapons, there is no guarantee that a future German government will forego the power and prestige such weapons afford. Presently, Germany is left with the alternatives of turning East, or to France, or to the United States, and all three

¹⁴Alastair Buchan, "NATO Divided," The New Republic, CXLVII (December 29, 1962), 15.

policies have serious overtones. There is also the possibility of seeking diplomatic solutions within the international system which is itself under transformation. But her course today is to rely on the United States and NATO, then hope through a concept such as MLF to gain greater control in planning, policy, and strategy. This maneuver, however, might well reduce chances at German unification. Something, after all, is going to have to be given up to Russia in order to regain East Germany. Though possibly not representative of Germany at large, Gerhard Schroeder, the Foreign Minister has written: "the growing impatience of the German people with the continued partition of Germany is finding increasing political expression."¹⁵ Recognizing the difficulties the MLF/ANF project has had, combined with the United States commitment in South East Asia, German foreign policy might well turn to pursue other more pressing problems while awaiting a solution, or seek further the diplomatic approach.

Having examined the MLF/ANF response and reaction to some of the problem areas in NATO up to the beginning of 1966, it is now necessary to up-date the information and examine relations in the time frame to July, 1966.

¹⁵Gerhard Schroeder, "Germany Looks at Eastern Europe, Foreign Affairs, XLIV (October, 1965), 19.

CHAPTER VII

EPILOGUE

The most significant event during the first half of 1966 has been the increased divergence between French and United States relations with respect to NATO. Though forecast by many and forewarned by de Gaulle, France's break with NATO was not expected so suddenly, nor so soon. No single occurrence within the Atlantic community had more far reaching implications than this independent action by France.

Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, wrote in February, 1966, that the North Atlantic area is still the decisive area and it needs our national attention."

". . . The hopes of the world for peace with freedom continue to depend chiefly on a strong, and confident Atlantic Community...."¹ But how much confidence can NATO have now that one of its most important members of vital geographic importance will completely withdraw militarily from the organization yet remain a member to the Alliance? The answer to this will depend in large part on American leadership in close cooperation with Great Britain, West Germany

¹United States Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, The Atlantic Alliance Basic Issues, 89th Congress, 2d Session, pursuant to S. Res. 151, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. III.

and the remaining fourteen Allies. Though the French move has alienated the Allies, and as the Jackson Subcommittee has stated; "it may become necessary to revise and reduce the American commitment to the defense of France," the policy now must be to make the best of the situation.² The appropriate policy, rather than creating an irretrievable gap, should be to leave an opening for France to return. This policy would be similar to the stated position made with respect to the MLF/ANF scheme. For, "if the key Atlantic allies move ahead together on the urgent issues-- as they have the right and duty to do so--sober second thoughts may in time prevail in the great and ancient French nation."³

All of the attention in NATO is focused on the present difficulties of the French withdrawal and, though an urgent issue, the nuclear force question has been sidestepped, at least for the time being. How long can this continue is a good question for the nuclear problems of the Alliance are complex and involve inter-allied confidence extensively. In fact, many of the current problems stem from and are involved with the question of nuclear weapons and their control. In this regard, General Norstad, former SACEUR has testified:

² Ibid., p. 9.

³ Ibid.

This whole subject, I need not remind you, is one of great complexity, involving almost every aspect of relationships between the countries of the Atlantic area and beyond. The reunification of Germany and other internal problems of the Federal Republic, the Franco-German relationship, the Common Market and other European activities, the position of Britain vis a vis the Continent and the United States, the nature of the ties between the two sides of the Atlantic, the proliferation of weapons, negotiations to limit the danger and destructiveness of war, the strength and direction of the Alliance itself--all of these subjects, and more, influence or are influenced by answers to the questions: How are the strategic resources of NATO to be organized and how is control to be exercised?

Not favorably inclined toward an ANF/MLF solution mainly because of the difficulties of creating a new strategic force, General Norstad advocates taking a partial amount of the tactical nuclear weapons already in NATO and giving the control over them to a majority rule of a special NATO Executive Committee made up of no more than five powers. A control system of this nature over a minimum number of weapons which would do away with the total American veto would, in General Norstad's opinion, satisfy the legitimate requirements of the Europeans.⁵ He feels this would be ". . . essential to credibility in the use of nuclear weapons as a defense and deterrent."⁶

⁴United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Atlantic Alliance, Hearings before Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 89th Congress, 2d Session, May 5 and 6, 1966, Part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 69.

⁵Ibid., pp. 76-87.

⁶Ibid., p. 83.

If the requirement for greater control is not settled in a reasonable time, then the dangers of proliferation might well be the outcome. During the hearings, Senator Harris made an explicit point of this in referring to the German issue by stating, "Some of my German friends indicated that they do not have to have their finger on the button or have the hardware, but they have to have something more than they have now if NATO is to stay a viable instrument of deterrence."⁷ Referring to the French example General Norstad replied:

Could you as a Minister or Chancellor in the Federal Republic say that Germany will remain dependent upon the good will and understanding of the United States in this respect, while a number of other countries are getting atomic weapons? I do not believe this is a political reality. I think you have to meet these things, even if they are sometimes distasteful, before you get into a real problem. It is too late at that time, we saw this with France. I believe that something like this, if it had been offered, might have worked, and I say only "might have," and I do not say it "would have." It might have solved the problem of France.⁸

The important point here is to insure that it doesn't happen to Germany as an alternative due to the lack of a solution within a NATO context. The immediate need of the Alliance may be to regroup in light of the French action, but the most pressing overall need is a solution to the nuclear control problem. As general Norstad has stated:

⁷Ibid., p. 84.

⁸Ibid.

A solution to the problem of the control of the nuclear weapons available for use by or on behalf of NATO could well be the most important single step towards reducing tensions, eliminating misunderstandings, within NATO. More than that, it would give a new sense of direction, a new authority to that organization.⁹

To solve the nuclear control problem within NATO might well be the most important single step the Alliance could make. For to do so, might create the cement necessary to tie the treaty together and forestall the proliferation of weapons, at least in Western Europe. If the Alliance begins to break up, other states will probably seek the French position, which states that France requires a nuclear force to preserve its national security and independence. Just one year ago, President de Gaulle reiterated his country's position:

From the viewpoint of security, our independence requires, in the atomic age we live in, that we have the necessary means to deter a possible aggressor ourselves, but without our allies holding our fate in their hands.¹⁰

The French have a strong argument when they claim that no nation can be independent and be able to defend itself without nuclear weapons. To France, nuclear power means national security, national integrity, and above all independence of action. But the argument is not very strong

⁹Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁰Charles de Gaulle, "The Independence of France" Vital Speeches, XXXI (June 15, 1965), 515.

when visualized without the American nuclear umbrella. A minimum deterrent such as the First Generation force de frappe with its 62 Mirage IV bombers has little to offer against an all out Soviet attack. Its biggest value has been as a political lever and to act as a triggering device to insure American response. In a recent world wide television discussion on nuclear weapons, Pierre Messmer, the French Defense Minister, elaborated on the value of the force:

It is certain that if France wanted to enter into a war of military conquest her atomic power would be useless, but this is not our problem. Our problem is to defend our territory, to defend our independence and our freedom. The problem facing a possible aggressor then is to know whether his aggression against France would be advantageous enough to make it worth his while. If France's atomic force is strong enough to make him pay dearly for his aggression, it is likely he will hesitate. This is what we call a deterrent.¹¹

On the other hand, the West Germans see the need for nuclear weapons in a NATO context, rather than as an independent national force. Here, the Germans want to be treated as an equal and have a share in the nuclear decision-making in the Alliance. In the same television debate via satellite, West German Defense Minister, Kai-uwe Von Hassel, made his statement on German desires:

There is no doubt in case of war be it a nuclear war or non-nuclear war my country will be the first to be

¹¹Fred Freed, "NBC White Paper: Countdown to Zero" (New York: National Broadcasting Company, 1966), I, p. 4. (Mimeographed transcript of T. V. broadcast Sunday, April 17, 1966, 6:30-7:30, EDT).

attacked and probably destroyed. For this reason we think it is a legitimate right for my country to ask for a participation in nuclear responsibility, in nuclear sharing.¹²

Franz Joseph Strauss, chairman of the Christian Socialist Union, warned of possible consequences ahead if Germany is not given a satisfactory role in NATO nuclear decision making:

I would like to say that we have no national ambitions, to control or command nuclear weapons. On the other hand, I . . . feel during the last election campaign those of us expressed our view that Germany or a country cannot be for the long run in the economic field a giant, in the political field a dwarf. If Germany would suffer discrimination I think we have to take into consideration an increasing lack of confidence into NATO, an increasing malaise and a kind of resignation or a kind of increased national ambitions.¹³

The British Government recognizes the need to share Alliance responsibility with Germany, but the British have been explicit in stating they want no German finger on the nuclear trigger. Patrick Gordon Walker, former British Foreign Minister, said:

I think anything to do with nuclear weapons involves dangers, of course. They're horrible dangerous things, but here one's got a choice and I think the finding of some satisfactory form of sharing for Germany is so much the lesser evil because the greater evil would be this frustration of German nationalism and its distortion.¹⁴

Denis Healey, British Defense Minister, spoke of the British V bomber force and four of the five Polaris submarines under construction as a possible solution. ". . . And we

¹²Ibid., IV, p. 2.

¹³Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 4.

believe that we can use them politically in order to promote agreement inside the Alliance which will discourage the further spread of nuclear weapons.¹⁵

In opposition, and probably well into the future, both France and Russia are adamantly opposed to any German ownership or control of her own force, or for that matter, any part in the decision to use any nuclear force. The Soviet Union has made the above position clear at the Geneva disarmament talks when presenting its proposal with regard to a non-proliferation treaty.

The United States is also most desirous of concluding a non-proliferation treaty, but insists that Germany has the right to participate in any NATO collective defense arrangement which will never involve national ownership of nuclear weapons. Under Secretary of State, George Ball concludes: ". . . What I'm suggesting is that the efforts have to go hand in hand and we can't sacrifice one in order to attain the other of we'll be defeating our own objectives in the long run."¹⁶ Thus the Geneva talks remain stalemated, and although the conference reopened in June, the prospects for a non-proliferation treaty seem remote.

Also remote are concrete proposals to settle the nuclear question within NATO. The NATO council meeting also in June, in Brussels, might have been the opportunity for the

¹⁵Ibid., I, p. 3.

¹⁶Ibid., V, p. 2.

Allies to consult further on NATO's nuclear problems, but the conference succeeded only in discussing the issue of the French decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated command.

The next six months will be critical for NATO, and although the United States has its attention deeply involved in South East Asia, the President has called for new initiatives to be studied and proposed for the NATO area. The current Hearings on NATO in both the Senate and House of Representatives should be helpful. The meetings of the McNamara Committee formed specifically to delve into nuclear matters of NATO should have the potential to solve at least some of the issues. De Gaulle's trip to Russia might well assist in bringing pressure to bear by opening up new opportunities. The possible forthcoming debate between East and West Germany will have an effect. Rumania is acting in the Warsaw Pact in many ways similar to France in NATO. Due to the financial burden, Great Britain is reducing its Army in West Germany. For the same reason, as well as Viet Nam commitments, the United States is under pressure to cut back in NATO. Rumors have also been heard that Russia might withdraw five of its twenty divisions for a quid pro quo by the United States. All of these events which are very current and difficult to analyze are having, and will have, a deep effect on NATO.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The revolution of world power with the ascendance of the Soviet Union as a great nuclear power has continued to make Western Europe the most vital security interest of the United States outside the North American Continent. The security and harmony of Western Europe are indispensable to America's safety and prosperity. On the other hand, Europe's very survival is dependent on the United States. As long as there is a common threat to the security of all members of NATO, and as long as some of those members need support, then the United States and her Allies can be said to share a common interest in maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance.

The MLF concept was designed by the United States to give cohesion to the Alliance by replacing the desire of nations to form or continue with national independent nuclear forces. It was felt that if control and ownership of a unified major nuclear force were attained, with a concomitant say in its planning, operation, and strategy, then the desire for independent forces would be satisfied.

By participating fully in United States nuclear strategy, NATO members would then be assured of American will to protect Europe even at the expense of its own cities. By working on common strategy together, not only would the members be assured, but they would develop the responsibility

that goes with being a major nuclear power. The strategy of a "flexible response" with the necessary balance between nuclear and conventional forces might then be accepted to a greater degree. The members then would be willing to contribute an equitable share of the forces and expenses involved in maintaining mutual defense. In short, it would mean cooperation in common defense toward a truly deterrent posture.

The design, it was hoped, would create major cooperation in the control of nuclear weapons which would lead to unified political control through the organization of MLF. The governing body would be a major unified political entity in itself. Once unity of control was realized in the military realm, it should then lead to further unity within Europe. Through MLF the United States would be tied to this developing unity insuring a partnership principle. Under Secretary Ball emphasized these points in November, 1964 when he said, "This multilateral force would, in our judgement, further strengthen the ties that bind the nations of the Atlantic partnership. It could give a new impetus to European unity."¹ The United States is desirous of a unified Europe that is linked to the United States in partnership, not a unified third force as de Gaulle envisions. It would be a

¹George W. Ball, "Germany and the Atlantic Partnership" The Department of State Bulletin, LI (November 30, 1964), 774.

Europe in which the British were included, based on European and American joint military, political, and economic policies. President Johnson has explained this concept in the following manner:

First we must seek to assist in increasing the unity of Europe as a key to Western strength and a barrier to resurgent and erosive nationalism.

Second we must all work to multiply in number and intimacy the tie between North America and Europe. For we shape an Atlantic civilization with an Atlantic destiny.²

MLF was just such an attempted United States policy to increase unity and tie the Atlantic partnership together. The result instead was disunity, therefore the vigorous campaign was dropped in December, 1964. As late as May, 1965, the President alluded to the original idea, but considered then current policy as allowing Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany to work on alternative solutions such as American and British Polaris submarines which would be collectively owned.³

The year, 1965, ended without any progress towards finding a formula for nuclear sharing. The major discussions between the United States, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany, held in December, ended with an agreement

²The Washington Post, December 4, 1964. Text of President Johnson's Georgetown University Speech on December 3.

³The New York Times, December 23, 1965; The Washington Post, December 16, 1965.

that, ". . . arrangements could be worked out to assure the members of the Alliance not having nuclear weapons an appropriate share in nuclear defense." But the key sentence in the joint communique stated, "The President and Chancellor agreed that discussions of such arrangements be continued between the two countries and with other interested allies."⁴ Thus, the official announced position was to continue to search for a solution that will prevent the spread of nuclear weapons while still allowing for an appropriate sharing principle--in reality, this meant the MLF proposal was put into a state of indefinite suspension with little prospect of active revival. The fact that the MLF is considered a "dead issue" has not been categorically stated officially to date; both Secretary of State, Rusk and Defense Secretary, McNamara in recent Congressional testimony inferred as much, but instead stressed the important role of the Special Committee (better known as the McNamara Committee).⁵ Former Presidential Adviser McGeorge Bundy was more explicit when he stated:

Given the concern of the early 1960's, the United States was right to support the MLF as a proposal, and

⁴The Washington Post, December 22, 1965.

⁵United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Atlantic Alliance, Hearings before Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 89th Congress, 2d Session, June 16, 1966, Part 5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 161-62; Ibid., June 21, 1966, Part 6, pp. 207-09.

equally right not to press it home as a proof of "leadership." Today it is plain there is no need of the MLF to reassure the Germans. West Germany is happy without it. No one else in Europe now supports it. The MLF is now quite clearly out of date, and I am confident that it will be possible for us to give a formal assurance on this point whenever the Soviet Government is really ready for a treaty of effective nonproliferation.⁶

The root of the problem of nuclear control lies not in the failure of the European governments to appreciate the strategy of "flexible response," but in the feeling that the selection of the nuclear option is not available to them. Each country views strategy as it vitally affects its own national interest and this is largely colored by geographic location. A "gradual response" which creates additional options for the United States, the Europeans feel, reduces their options, inasmuch as, it casts doubt on the availability of the United States nuclear force. There is no doubt, the Europeans welcome United States forces because they act as extra hostages that strengthen the United States nuclear commitment. But the support of these forces in a conventional strategy or additions to them is looked upon in a different manner. Western Europe fears becoming a battleground while the United States and the Soviet Union remain privileged sanctuaries.

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"Adviser to Two Presidents Looks at Trends in Europe", U. S. News and World Report, LXI (July 4, 1966), 53, Text of McGeorge Bundy before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 20, 1966.

Thus a consensus on alliance strategy may never be achieved, but this does not make it necessary to completely castigate the MLF idea. In the first place, MLF was not designed as a first strike weapon. Its role was to be one of deterrence within American nuclear forces. Its use was not envisioned without the use of United States nuclear weapons; therefore, the idea that an American veto made it less credible did not stand up, at least in the United States opinion---the Europeans, however, had a different outlook.

What did stand out in the MLF concept was the fact that it was to provide a force that was owned and controlled by Europeans. Through its governing body, access to American strategic planning, formulation, and control was to be gained and the American guarantee assured. By creating a European force which would give NATO non-nuclear powers a say or influence in the control over their separate destinies, the hope was that the need for independent forces would be satisfied. MLF symbolized an impressive nuclear force that had great military value many times stronger than any independent force and a great deal less expensive.

But its greatest value was seen as tying the United States to Europe and Europe to the United States. Granted, the American veto made the United States a trustee for the Alliance, but is it not already? MLF was to integrate American power into the Alliance in a larger way, thus creating a greater interdependence. If independent national

forces are allowed to form, the tendency will be to split the Alliance and no longer will nations seek dependence on a common defense which is so necessary in this nuclear age.

If NATO is allowed to disintegrate because of narrow nationalism and lack of settling the control issue, it would be a major political and military loss to the United States national security, as well as to the West. The Soviet Union would have won a major victory as its purpose has been to divide NATO whenever possible. Moscow realizes only too well the political and military value and importance of NATO, otherwise constant propaganda would not be maintained against the Alliance. In this regard, the Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, addressing the Eleventh NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, said in part:

They want to divide, and ultimately to control Europe; and they find propaganda about German revanchism and an illusory German threat extremely useful for the purpose.

In this situation two main tasks are incumbent on the Alliance and will continue to be so for a long time to come. One is to maintain the military balance, which has deterred and will continue to deter aggression and blackmail; and the other is to preserve a unity of political action between the European States themselves and between Europe, United States and Canada. If it fails in these, Soviet political maneuvering will in the long run find a weak spot of which it can take advantage in order to divide and ultimately to control us.⁷

⁷United States Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, The Atlantic Alliance: Allied Comment, 89th Congress, 2d Session, pursuant to S. Res. 57, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 55.

The actions of France have by no means contributed to fulfilling either of the two main tasks outlined by the Secretary General. Acting independently, assuming complete freedom of action in world affairs, de Gaulle has opened a serious gap in the military, as well as the political unity of the Alliance. The question here, however, is whether the MLF proposal assisted de Gaulle in deciding to take some of the actions he has embarked on. As noted in Chapter Seven, General Norstad has given the answer that an early solution to some control of weapons might have prevented France from embarking on an independent national force. It is doubtful that the MLF would have prevented the force de frappe. The whole concept called for integration and a United States presence and leadership, at least until Europe united-- de Gaulle's policies run in the opposite direction. There is no doubt, however, the MLF assisted in causing Franco-American relations to become strained.

Nonetheless, the MLF was an honest proposal to provide an alternative to the proliferation of national nuclear forces. It was an attempt to provide NATO Allies with a greater voice in nuclear strategy with the hope to achieve cohesion within the Alliance; instead the reverse effect seems to have been the case. Today, alliances (both West and East) are in the process of transformation, and the military aspects of NATO are perceived by many as subordinate to the political. Because the values placed on NATO by each member of the Alliance

are in such variance in relation to the conceived Soviet threat, the MLF in such an environment is not seen as very relevant. Consequently, the Special Committee (McNamara Committee) has been formed and is searching for ways to solve NATO's nuclear problems by means other than an MLF/ANF scheme.

Thus, the search continues to keep NATO a bulwark of strength in order to deter any Communist ambitions or probing of weaknesses. The United States position is that the unilateral reduction of armed force or the dilution of political solidarity in NATO will upset the balance in Europe and undermine the basis for new negotiations with the Communists. The achievement of a secure settlement between East and West will not be assisted by a disintegrating Alliance.

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
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